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The American Rule' does not allow a prevailing litigant to recover
an attorney fee from the losing litigant.2 The rule has long been subject
to both judicially fashioned 3 and statutory4 exceptions. In addition to

these exceptions, the common fund doctrine, in providing for recovery
not from the losing defendant but from those who share in the benefit of
5
the litigation, functions as a partial exception to the rule.
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1. Most other countries with comparable litigation systems use some form of fee shifting. The
significance of this fact cannot be assessed in a vacuum. Litigation content, legal culture, trial costs,
and other elements may be quite different in different systems. Litigation of cases involving substantial doubt as to the law and the facts is common in the United States, for example, but perhaps not so
common in Europe. In the absence of predictable outcomes, routine fee shifting is more difficult to
justify. Additionally, the degree to which fees are fixed by the adversary process varies from country
to country. See Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37, 55-59.

2. The American Rule was supposedly established in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
306 (1796). See Leubsdorf, Towarda History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 15.

3. Fee shifting is permitted when a contract between the parties so provides, when the loser
acts in bad faith or vexatiously, and when attorney fees constitute an item of damages recoverable
under ordinary damages rules (as where the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for malicious prosecution or on an injunction bond). Fees are also awarded in certain cases of contempt of court, and in
certain domestic relations cases in which one party has a duty to support the other. See generally D.
DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.8 (1973).
4. Examples of such statutory exceptions may be found in 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (antitrust
claims) and 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982) (copyright claims). Although there are now many such statutory exceptions, they are so narrow in scope that they have provoked no general reconsideration of
fee shifting.
5. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
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As long as the American Rule was subject to only minor exceptions,
fee litigation remained a small industry. But with the passage of legisla-

tion in 19646 and 1976,7 the prevailing plaintiff in most civil rights actions became entitled to recover a reasonable fee from the losing party.
The growth of civil rights litigation, the passage of additional legislation

authorizing fee awards,8 and the increase in litigation of class actions that
permit fee awards 9 have all engendered considerable secondary litigation

over attorney fees. 10 This litigation has in turn engendered criticism fo12
cusing on the excessiveness of fees,"1 the disproportionality of awards,
and the burdens placed on the judicial system. At the same time, it is not

clear that the structure for calculating fee awards can achieve the aim of
fee award statutes by producing the compensation necessary to attract
13
counsel to civil rights cases.

A variety of factual situations may give rise to attorney fee awards.
Fee awards based on misconduct in the litigation itself are possible in
cases of all kinds. 14 Fee awards are also made in many cases involving no
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
7. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
8. For a list ofover 100 federal statutes that authorize fee awards, see Marek v. Chesny, 105 S.
Ct. 3012, 3035-39 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). A list is included in every issue of the Attorney
Fee Awards Reporter. See, ag., FederalStatutes Authorizing the Award of Attorney Fees, ATT'Y FEE
AWARDS RPTR., June 1986, at 2-3.
9. See, eg., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
10. The increase in fee litigation has prompted a significant amount of legal scholarship. See
M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES (1985); E. LARSON, FEDERAL
COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (1981); S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES (1973); Berger,
CourtAwarded Attorney Fees: What is 'Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977); Rowe, The
Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A CriticalOverview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651. The Third Circuit
has published the report of a task force appointed to recommend solutions to some of the problems.
REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES, 108

F.R.D.

237 (1985) [hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT REPORT]. Some researchers have sought to provide a better
picture of costs of litigation, both public and private. See J. KAKALIK & R. Ross, COSTS OF THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF CIVIL CASES (1983);

Kritzer, Sarat, Trubek, Bumiller & McNichol, Understandingthe Costs of Litigation: The Case of
the Hourly-Fee Lawyer, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 559 [hereinafter Kritzer].
11. Allegations of exaggerated claims of billable hours, excessive charges for hours billed, and
poor documentation are common. See, eg., Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952-55 (1st
Cir. 1984); Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, 738 F.2d 364, 368 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
784 (1985).
12. Disproportion between the plaintiff's recovery and the amount of the fee is common. See
infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text. Because many of the benefits secured by the suit may be
external to the plaintiff, a discrepancy between the damage award and the fee award does not necessarily indicate that the fee award is unreasonable. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S, Ct. 2686,
2694 (1986); THIRD CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 252.
13. The civil rights statutes are explicitly aimed at providing fees "adequate to attract competent counsel." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5913.
14. See infra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
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fault at all; courts have awarded fees in a wide range of commercial, 15
government, 16 and public interest litigation.17
The practice of awarding attorney fees against adversaries is causing
15. Fees may be awarded in cases involving willful trademark violations, see Sealy, Inc. v. Easy
Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1984), willful patent infringements, see Lam, Inc. v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982), antitrust
violations, see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982), and copyright violations, see 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982).
Contract claims may also engender fee shifting. See, eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01
(Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 12-120(1) (Supp. 1986). Many contracts, especially consumer and
debt contracts, provide that only the drafting party can collect attorney fees. Statutes in some states
equalize the position of the parties in such cases by providing that either party may recover a fee
upon prevailing. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 20.096 (Supp.
1985). Consumers may also claim fee awards under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(3) (1982), or under state unfair trade acts. Cf Tousley v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 752
F.2d 96, 105 (4th Cir. 1985) (buyer of vehicle recovered fees in case brought under South Carolina
Business Opportunity Sales Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-57-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
16. Both the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982), and the Privacy Act
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B) (1982), impose fee liability on the government in cases where the
plaintiff substantially prevails. Environmental litigation in which the government is the defendant
may also engender fee awards against the government. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (1982) (court may
award fees in Clean Air Act proceedings where "such award is appropriate"). The Equal Access to
Justice Act authorizes a fee in favor of the prevailing plaintiff and against the United States when the
litigating position of the United States was not substantially justified. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West
Supp. 1986) (authorizing fee awards in certain agency proceedings); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A)
(West Supp. 1986) (authorizing fee awards in certain civil actions). Awards under this act have been
made in a variety of litigation contexts. See Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1229-38 (8th
Cir. 1985) (taxpayer awarded attorney fees in successful refund suit); United States v. 640.00 Acres
of Land, 756 F.2d 842, 847-48 (11th Cir. 1985) (former landowner awarded attorney fees where
condemnation award exceeded government prelitigation offer); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 735 F.2d 895, 898-902 (5th Cir. 1984) (civil rights plaintiff awarded
attorney fees); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (public interest corporation awarded attorney fees for successful challenge to Civil Aeronautics Board regulations).
17. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 128-33 (1980) (upholding fee award in suit to recover
Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (affirming
union defendant's liability for fee award where union member's litigation conferred substantial benefit on union as a whole); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing reduction of fee award in housing discrimination action); Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337, 339-40 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding that prisoner denied access to law library may obtain fees even if he recovers no
damages).
Some litigants seek judicial restructuring of social or political institutions. Such litigation often
takes years and engenders substantial fee awards for the prevailing plaintiff. See Institutionalized
Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 917 (3d Cir. 1985) (fee award appropriate in
suit challenging procedure governing commitment of juveniles to mental health facilities); Hennigan
v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985) (fee award appropriate where
plaintiff successfully settled school board reapportionment suit); In re Kansas Congressional Dists.
Reapportionment Cases, 745 F.2d 610, 612-13 (10th Cir. 1984) (fee award appropriate in successful
congressional district reapportionment suit); see also Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 722-23
(1974) (delaying fee award until conclusion of predictably lengthy litigation would discourage institution of actions, contrary to congressional intent; therefore interim fee award appropriate).
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important changes in the way litigation is financed in the United States.18
Financing litigation by fee awards provides a new incentive to lawyers to
increase their fees. The adversary's predictable response is to litigate the
fee claim itself. The result is that the courts must either risk the escalation of fees or devote public and private resources to the fee litigation
after the merits have been fully resolved.
Courts have not confronted this dilemma squarely. On the one
hand, they have exhorted lawyers to claim only reasonable fees and to
avoid excessive litigation over the fee itself.19 On the other hand, because
fees cannot be contained if litigation to limit them is restricted, courts
have increasingly prescribed rules regarding the litigation of the fee
20
claim.
Problems generated by this dilemma and other constraints of a feeshifting regime have become significant. Quite possibly resolution of feeshifting problems will come only when we develop a coherent theory of
litigation finance-one in which fee shifting, as a means of financing litigation, might play only a relatively small part. But the practical
problems of fee shifting should be understood before alternative methods
of litigation finance are considered. It is to those problems that this article turns.
The problems considered here fall into three broad categories. First,
what are the bases for shifting attorney fees? 2 1 Second, who is entitled to
22
fee awards, and how is liability to be allocated among different parties?
2
3
Third, how are fees to be calculated? This third question encompasses
many of the most troubling problems in the American system of fee shifting, and my analysis leads to the conclusion that alternative methods
should be considered in developing general principles of litigation
finance.

18. The topic of litigation financing has received less attention than it deserves. For a compilation of data pertaining to public costs of civil litigation, see J. KAKALIK & R. Ross, supra note 10.
Private costs far exceed public costs. One observer estimated that the legal profession contributed
about $30 billion to the GNP in 1980-an amount that exceeded the electric power industry's contribution. See Cutler, Conflicts of Interest, 30 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1016 (1981). Dean Cramton, writing in 1985, estimated that lawyers' charges may be as high as $50 billion annually. Cramton, The
Trouble with Lawyers (andLaw Schools), 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 360 (1985).
19. See, eg., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
20. See infra notes 311-16 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 24-78 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 79-168 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 169-330 and accompanying text.
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BASES OF FEE SHIFTING

The Common Law Private Attorney GeneralExperiment.

Before the passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976,24 some federal courts experimented with fee awards authorized
neither by statute nor by common law. The Supreme Court held in 1968
that when a civil rights statute did authorize a fee award, that award
should ordinarily be granted, at least when only injunctive relief was
available. 25 The Court explained that in civil rights cases the plaintiff
acted as a "private attorney general," vindicating public rights. 2 6 Lower
federal courts expanded the private attorney general rationale to allow
plaintiffs to recover attorney fees even when Congress had not authorized
a fee recovery. 27 The Supreme Court rejected this approach in Alyeska
PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society,28 a decision that prompted the
enactment of a general civil rights fee award statute.29
Today most courts make fee awards only if there is statutory authorization or if the award would have been allowed under the common
law.30 Of the several common law grounds, 3 1 only a few have ever had

much general application. First, a fee award is possible if a valid contract calls for payment of attorney fees to the fee claimant.32 Second, the
attorney fee may be recovered as an item of damages in malicious prosecution suits. 33 Finally, when a defendant's tortious conduct or breach of
contract causes the plaintiff to litigate with a third party, the defendant
may be liable for the attorney fees generated. 34 None of these grounds,
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
25. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
26. Id.
27. See, eg., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98-102 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
28. 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). California, however, still adheres to the private attorney general
theory. See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 38-48, 569 P.2d 1303, 1309-16, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 32027 (1977).
29. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
30. A few states also make fee awards under the private attorney general theory. See supra
note 28; see also Senior Citizens Coalition v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 355 N.W.2d 295, 302
n. 10 (Minn. 1984) (stating in dictum that the private attorney general rule is "well established," but
citing only California law).
31. See supra note 3.
32. See, eg., Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1985); Fortier v.
Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1984).
33. See, e.g., Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184
(1975). Cf Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.) (allowing civil rights plaintiff to
recover attorney fees incurred in wrongful criminal prosecution), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Costa, 789 F.2d 83, 88-90 (lst Cir.
1986); Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In the
case of a statutory cause of action, however, the absence of a fee provision may preclude the recovery
of fees as an item of damages. See, eg., Summit Valley Indus., Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters
Local 112, 456 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1982).
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however, has played a major role in contemporary cases. There are three

sets of circumstances in which fee awards are most often made today: (1)
when the common fund doctrine or its substantial benefit expansion ap-

plies, (2) when there has been misconduct in litigation, and (3) when a
statute authorizes a fee award.
B.

Common Fund and the SubstantialBenefit Expansion.

The common fund rule permits one who has litigated successfully
and thereby conferred a benefit upon others to require those who have
benefited to share in the cost of producing the benefit-that is, to share in
the attorney fee. 35 For example, a beneficiary of a trust might sue trust-

ees who have siphoned off assets of the trust. When a recovery is made,
it is enjoyed by all the beneficiaries, not merely the plaintiff, and accordingly the fund recovered should bear the attorney fee.3 6 This rule lies
37
behind the award of attorney fees from funds recovered in class actions,

and in some stockholder's derivative suits.3a
The common fund rule originated as a restitutionary rule to prevent
unjust enrichment of the other beneficiaries at the client-plaintiff's expense. 39 It was quickly expanded, however, to permit lawyers themselves
to recover a fee from the beneficiaries and to recover more than the plaintiff had paid or become obligated to pay the lawyer.40 In this expanded

version, the common fund rule may well go beyond restitution, but the
theoretical basis for doing so, if there is any, has not been found. The

restitutionary basis of the rule is preserved, however, in that it is the
beneficiaries of the fund, not the losing party or the adversary, who must

share in the fee. The winning plaintiffs, not the losing defendants, are
41
liable under the common fund rule.

35. See Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105
U.S. 527 (1881). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from
Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974) (discussing origins and development of common fund
doctrine).
36. Cf Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 528-29 (1881) (suit by bondholder against trustees
who depleted assets held to secure bonds).
37. See, eg., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
38. See infra note 45.
39. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 166-69 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Dawson, supra note 35.
40. Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1885).
41. This is formally correct, but in practice the fund created must be sufficient to satisfy both
the claims on the merits and the fee, so that when settlement rather than litigation is involved, the
adversary may negotiate directly about both the merits and the fee size, if permitted to do so by
ethical considerations. Ethical objections are discussed in Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d
1015, 1019-21 (1977).
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The common fund rule has been expanded in a novel way in several
cases to include "benefits" that are intangible and perhaps even nonexistent. In Hall v. Cole,42 a union member was improperly ousted by his

union after he had criticized union officials. The union member sued the
union and won reinstatement. This was no doubt a victory for union

democracy, but it resulted in no money recovery or other tangible benefit. Nevertheless, the Court held that the union members had benefited
substantially and that imposing fee liability upon the union was an appropriate way to make the union share the cost of the benefit. 4 3 This
benefit is fictional, 44 and all the more so because it goes under the name

of "substantial benefit."
Courts have taken a similar approach in stockholder's derivative

suits. Thus the corporation-defendant may be held liable for the plaintiff's attorney fees even though the litigation produces no money or tangible benefit. 4 5 Because the defendant is forced to pay the winning
plaintiff's fee, these cases are more closely related to the judicially rejected private attorney general model than to a restitutionary model involving the sharing of fee costs by a group of victors.
C. Misconduct in Litigation.
Two kinds of misconduct in litigation may give rise to fee awards:
the assertion of groundless or unfounded claims or defenses, 4 6 and the

assertion of good claims or defenses in a bad-faith manner. 47 Courts use
42. 412 U.S. 1 (1973). The dissident-against-union pattern found in Hall is repeated in many
cases. See Murphy v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 774 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1201 (1986); Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters'
Union Local 10, 749 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1984); Shimman v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs
Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1191 (1985).
43. Hall, 412 U.S. at 8-9.
44. Cf.Shimman v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1235
n.13 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The common benefit theory should not be allowed to merge into the private
attorney general approach."), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1191 (1985). There may be some sort of "benefit" in these cases, but it is one that the "beneficiaries" have not asked for and are not in a position to
reject. In the common fund cases, on the other hand, the beneficiary can choose to reject a share of
the fund and avoid fee liability. Although this option is seldom exercised, the ability to reject both
benefit and liability means that no benefit is foisted upon an unwilling recipient. This is not true in
the "substantial benefit" cases, where the recipient is involuntarily forced to pay for the benefit. This
violates fundamental fair play and the rules of restitution. See D. DoBBS,supra note 3, § 4.9.
45. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970). When the litigation
neither produces a fund nor enforces a right, fee awards have been denied. See, e.g., Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
46. See, e.g., American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Teasdale, 733 F.2d 559, 569-70 (8th Cir.
1984).
47. See, e.g., Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350, 358 (7th Cir. 1984) (remanding to determine point
in litigation when it should have become clear to plaintiffs that further discovery would be frivolous);
Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (fees
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an objective test that resembles the probable cause test used in malicious
prosecution cases4 8 to decide whether there were reasonable grounds for

the claim or defense asserted. Under this test, the assertion of "unreasonable," "meritless," "groundless," or "frivolous" 49 claims or defenses

constitutes objective fault. Courts use a subjective test to decide whether
there was bad faith in the conduct of litigation. This test, which resembles the "malice" test used in malicious prosecution cases, 50 inquires into
the litigant's state of mind, focusing on improper purpose such as intent
51
to harass or delay.

Courts impose fee liability in common law malicious prosecution
cases only when the plaintiff establishes that the prior suit was brought
with "malice" and without probable cause. 52 Some courts have taken a
similar approach in fee-shifting cases based on misconduct in litigation
outside the civil rights context, requiring the fee claimant to establish

both objective and subjective fault, that is, that a groundless suit was

53
accompanied by an improper purpose.
In civil rights cases, in contrast, the Supreme Court has stated that
one need not establish subjective fault to recover fees. 54 It suffices to

establish objective misconduct by showing that the claim or defense was
initially asserted groundlessly, frivolously, or unreasonably, or by showing that the fee-defender continued to assert the claim or defense after its
impropriety had become apparent. 55 With respect to the analogous maliawarded where defendants engaged in dilatory tactics, failed to meet filing deadlines, misused discovery, and misled court by misquoting or omitting material portions of documentary evidence).
48. For a discussion of the probable cause test used in malicious prosecution cases, see W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 119 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
49. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1978).
50. For a discussion of the "malice" test used in malicious prosecution cases, see PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 48, § 119.
51. See Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
52. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, § 119. "Malice" is a term of art in tort law; it has
no fixed meaning and does not necessarily import subjective bad faith.
53. See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 390 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1464 (1986); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th
Cir. 1983); see also Note, Attorneys' Fee Awards to Complex Litigation Defendants: Striking a Balance, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 818, 838-43 (1983). Under Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412, 421 (1978), subjective fault is not required in civil rights cases. Courts requiring both
objective and subjective fault in cases outside the civil rights area have generally not discussed reasons for adopting a different view. In light of the fact that the civil rights plaintiff is given a preferred
position-by virtue of the one-way fee shifting rules adopted in Christiansburgitself, for examplethe Court's willingness to impose liability on the civil rights plaintiff without subjective fault would
seem to suggest that at least as demanding a rule ought to be imposed on other plaintiffs.
54. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
55. See id. at 422; Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350, 358 (7th Cir. 1984).
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cious prosecution cases, 56 commentators have said that a want of probable cause may be evidence of malice, because ordinarily one would not
persist in litigation without colorable grounds unless one were motivated
by an improper purpose. 57 This rule is somewhat troublesome in the
common law cases, and it has so far been rejected in the bad faith fee58
shifting cases.

In one situation, establishing subjective fault by itself might be sufficient. This is the situation in which a sound claim or defense is asserted

in an improper manner, as where a party misleads the judge, or engages
in excessive discovery or dilatory tactics. 59 But even in this case, it is

doubtful whether the subjective state of mind is really what counts. Instead it appears that the objectively improper conduct, not personal animosity, is probably the important element.
Some statutes require a lesser showing of fault than do the judgemade rules. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 60 for example, the
government is liable for attorney fees if it has litigated a position without
substantial justification. The offer of judgment rule provides another ex-

ample. 61 This rule applies when a plaintiff62 rejects a settlement offer
and litigates to a conclusion less favorable than the offer. It imposes lia-

bility for costs incurred after the offer, that is, for the added costs of
litigation.
This may include attorney fees, which some statutes treat as
"costs." ' 63 Some may regard the offer of judgment rule as based on an56. Malicious prosecution is analogous because it functions to shift attorney fees. See Note,
Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A HistoricalAnalysis, 88 YALE L.J.

1218 (1979).
57. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, § 119, at 884.

58. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 391 (2d Cir.
1985) (fact that defenses were colorless does not necessarily mean they were asserted for an improper
purpose), cerL denied, 106 S.Ct. 1464 (1986).
59. See Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) ("where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy or malefides, the
assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of attorneys' fees against him"; language
directed at misconduct such as dilatory tactics).
60. 5 U.S.C.A. § 504(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986) (authorizing fee awards in certain agency proceedings); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1986) (authorizing fee awards in certain civil
actions).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.

62. This is a one-way fee-shifting rule in that it seems to work only against plaintiffs or others
affirmatively asserting a claim. The rule provides that "a party defending against a claim may serve
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him." Id. (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). If the
statute involved does not define "costs" to include fees, fees are not available under Rule 68. See
Marek v. Chesny, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 3017 n.2 (1985) (noting that Rule 68 incorporates the definition of
costs that otherwise applies to the case). A statute that authorizes costs does not necessarily authorize fees. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980) (costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
do not include attorney fees). Although Congress has revised the statute in Roadway, see Morris v.
Adams-Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1357 n.7 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that the category of expenses
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other species of fault; but if it is a species of fault, the fault involved is
presumed rather than established. 64

Basing a claim for fees on an allegation of litigation misconduct may
have advantages in particular cases. First, federal courts have held that

public entities cannot avoid fee liability based on bad-faith litigation,
even though such entities may be otherwise immune by reason of the
eleventh amendment. 65 Second, it is conceivable that a nonprevailing
party might be entitled to some award if a portion of the adversary's
claim was tainted by litigation misconduct.

If a claim or defense is frivolous from the start, the fee claimant can
usually obtain a full fee award against the frivolous litigator. 66 But if the
claim's lack of substance becomes apparent only at a later stage in the

litigation, or if the fee award is based on misconduct in the way the claim
is pursued, the fee liability is more limited: only the added costs imposed

by the misconduct or by the pursuit of the claim after it was discovered
67
to be groundless are recoverable.

D. Prevailingas a Litigant.
Most statutes that authorize fee shifting do so on grounds indepen-

dent of fault or benefit. The basic requirement found in almost all statutes is that the party seeking the fee award be a "prevailing" party.6 8
Some statutes condition the right to a fee further by allowing an award
only to the prevailing plaintiff.6 9 Other statutes allow the judge discrerecoverable under section 1927 has been expanded to include attorney fees), the case nonetheless
demonstrates that the words of a statute authorizing costs will be important. Note that Rule 68 does
not impose liability upon a plaintiff who has lost completely, but only upon one who has obtained a
judgment for an amount less favorable than the defendant's settlement offer. See Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 360 (1981).
64. Rule 68 is designed to encourage settlement, but its theory is not clear. If fault is the basis
for the fee liability, why is this a one-way rule limited to offers made by the defendant? And why are
there no protections for the plaintiff who receives an offer too early in the case to make an intelligent
response to it? I suspect that some degree of fault is being presumed, perhaps not always fairly.
65. See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 388-89 (2d Cir.
1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986). Since the eleventh amendment does not immunize states
from fee liability in civil rights cases, however, this bad-faith exception is of limited importance. See
infra note 135 and accompanying text.
66. Civil rights plaintiffs whose claims are frivolous may be forgiven some or all of their fee
liability because of their relative poverty, however. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
67. See, eg., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 389 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986); Cote v. James River Corp., 761 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir.
1985). If the fee claimant cannot show that the frivolous litigation imposed added costs, the fee
claim may be denied. See Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Stangel,
762 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
68. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
69. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
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tion in deciding whether to award a fee to the prevailing party. 70 The
civil rights fee award statutes, however, require only that the litigant pre71
vail on the merits of the litigation.
E. A Comment on the Theory of Fee Awards.
Fee awards made under the litigation misconduct rule are relatively
easy to justify.72 The justification for imposing strict

73

fee liability upon a

litigant merely because he loses is less clear, however.
One theory is that the prevailing party's fees should be recoverable
as damages resulting from the violation of the plaintiff's substantive
rights. This theory is generally unsatisfactory. As a normative theory, it
is questionable because it would not allow fees to a prevailing defendant.74 As a theory to explain existing law, it is inadequate because it
would require fee awards in all prevailing plaintiff cases, not merely in
cases where an award is statutorily authorized. 75 It might be desirable to
adopt a general rule awarding attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs and a
general rule denying such awards to prevailing defendants, even in a society such as ours in which the law is often uncertain and in which both
defendants and plaintiffs are encouraged to resort to litigation. But the
theory behind such a rule is incongruous with current practice.
70. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). The civil rights statutes have been
construed, despite their neutral text, to provide for one-way fee shifting. See infra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text.
72. Professor Rowe has made a thorough analysis of possible legal theories for fee awards. See
Rowe, supra note 10. Professor Rowe identifies six rationales for fee awards. Some of these have
been collapsed for simplicity in the present discussion; two are not directly discussed. One of these is
the rationale that fee shifting can be used to provide "equalization of party strengths." Id. at 665.
The other is the rationale that fee shifting can be structured so as to encourage meritorious small
claims and to discourage weak ones. Id. at 665-66. As Professor Rowe notes, however, it is difficult
to hypothesize a model under which an effective balance of incentives would be achieved.
73. At least in some sense, fee liability is strict in any case in which litigation is conducted
reasonably and in good faith, even when there is fault on the merits.
74. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 657-59. Professor Rowe, however, is persuaded by the damages or "make whole" theory, and seems happy enough to accept the one-way fee shifting that
results. See id. at 679.
75. Under a damages theory, fee liability would be, subject only to causal limits, the rule in
every case. The prevailing defendant could not recover under this theory, since the plaintiff would
not have violated his substantive rights. To cover both prevailing defendants and prevailing plaintiffs, a theory of strict liability for choosing to litigate would have to be adopted. Some rules do exist
that permit fees as damages in certain cases, but these rules have no general application. See supra
note 33. There is language, however, in Evans v. JeffD., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1539 (1986), that treats the
fee award under the civil rights statutes as a "remedy." But it is not clear that the Court has embraced the theory that the award is an element of damages resulting from the original civil rights
violation.
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Statutes awarding fees to prevailing parties are often thought justified on the theory that they represent legislative versions of the private

attorney general rule. But even if the plaintiff's litigation has benefited
the public, it does not obviously follow that private defendants 76 should

pay for this public benefit. 77 Indeed, insofar as a defendant litigates reasonably and in good faith, the general public benefit that is derived from
litigation may flow as much from the efforts of the defendant as from

those of the plaintiff. From this perspective, the broad principle behind
the private attorney general theory suggests that the public should pay

attorney fees for both sides, not that the prevailing plaintiff alone should
recover a fee.

A third theory might be that one who chooses to litigate should be
strictly liable, regardless of the reasonableness of the litigation. An analogy might be made to theories of strict liability in tort law. 78 Such a
76. Public entities are defendants in many civil rights cases. When such entities are defendants,
their liability might be regarded as a kind of public liability for the public benefit. But it is a costly
benefit. First, there is the cost of fee fixing: Second, there is the problem in some cases of double
public payments, as where a publicly funded legal services organization collects fees from a public
entity defendant. See infra text accompanying notes 127-28. Furthermore, insofar as the problem is
one of distributive justice, its resolution by means of the corrective justice system of the courts seems
inappropriate.
77. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 655. Although Professor Rowe points out that the public
might reimburse the winner if reimbursement is desirable, he dismisses this outcome as unlikely. In
discussing the private attorney general doctrine specifically, he emphasizes the externalized benefits
accruing in some cases and concludes that the "basic rationale for having someone other than the
successful plaintiff bear at least the share of the legal expenses beyond that related to plaintiff's own
benefit" is sound. Id. at 663.
I disagree. Although a public benefit analysis suggests that someone other than the successful
plaintiff should pay some of the costs, it does not always suggest that the defendant should do so. It
suggests, in fact, that the public should do so. It may be unlikely that the public will pay some of the
costs, but that does not affect the question whether there is any justification for imposing the costs
upon a defendant. Furthermore, in a democratic society, it seems to be bad policy to impose costs
upon the public indirectly-by imposing them upon a defendant who then passes them on to the
public-if the public would reject those costs were they imposed directly. As to the likelihood that
the public would accept the burdens of litigation costs, it should be noted that the public has already
accepted many of those costs. See supra note 18.
Later, Professor Rowe justifies a charge against defendants rather than against the public on the
fees-as-damages theory. See Rowe, supra note 10, at 672. But as to cases in which public benefit is
the main theory of the fee award, he concedes that payment from public funds might sometimes be
the only justifiable solution. He appears in the end to dismiss this, however, on the pragmatic
ground that public funds are not available for this purpose. See id. at 672-73.
78. Commentators have argued for strict liability in tort cases on the moral ground that one
who chooses a course of conduct receives the benefits of that conduct and should also pay for its
costs. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY 71-75 (1980). Economic theories of
strict liability in tort also abound. See, e.g., G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
Moral and economic theories, however, are difficult to adapt to the fee liability problem. An
argument for strict fee liability would be based on the premise that one who chooses to litigate
should pay the costs that litigation entails. The problem of access to courts as a social means of
dispute resolution poses a serious impediment to using this line of reasoning. Another problem
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theory does not explain the present legal rules, however, since no existing
rule sanctions fee shifting in all cases. And strict liability for honest litigation does not accord well with ideals of open access to courts.
None of the theories surveyed above answers the question why some
of the costs of litigation are to be paid by the loser while others are to be
paid by the public. For example, if the defendant is required to pay the
plaintiff's litigation costs because the defendant's activities generated the
litigation, should not the defendant be required to pay the public's costs
as well? Yet under current practice, no liability is imposed for, say, a
share of the judge's salary or a pro rata share of the cost of maintaining
the court house. The historical allocation of litigation costs between private litigants and the public may not be rational; but any satisfying feeshifting theory will have to account for that allocation or propose a new
one.
The absence of a comprehensive theory makes it difficult to analyze
many fee award problems. For example, if a fee award in favor of a
prevailing plaintiff is justified only because the person who pays is also
the person who violated the plaintiff's substantive rights, then an intervenor who supports the losing defendant's position should not be liable.
On the other hand, if fee awards are justified by a strict liability theory,
that same intervenor should be liable for a share of the plaintiff's fees.
The absence of a comprehensive theory of fee shifting leaves no principled basis for deciding such issues. This problem with theoretical underpinnings explains why some of the issues discussed in this article are
inherently as well as practically difficult to analyze.

I.

ENTITLEMENT TO AND ALLOCATION OF FEE AWARDS

As a threshold issue, a fee claimant must establish a basis for an
award under one of the theories discussed above or one of the common
law exceptions. Several issues of entitlement may arise under any one of
the theories for fee awards. These include questions of discretion in fee
awards and the conditions under which particular parties are to receive
or pay fees. Questions involving the allocation of fee liability among
multiple defendants also arise.
A. Discretion in Fee Awards.
The civil rights fee award statutes speak of making an award in the
arises in applying this reasoning to the defendant who litigates in response to a complaint initiated by
the plaintiff. The defendant is arguably acting under compulsion and should be excused from fee
liability.
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court's "discretion. ' 79 Although such language apparently authorizes
the judge to grant or deny the award,80 this discretion has been judicially
encumbered. In a civil rights case there is virtually no discretion to deny
a fee award to a prevailing plaintiff: the award must be made in the
absence of some factor peculiar to the individual case, such as misconduct in the litigation by the plaintiff.81 The defendant's good faith is thus
in effect no more a defense to the fee claim than it is to the merits of
many civil rights claims.
B.

One- Way Fee Shifting.

82
Some statutes authorize fee awards only to prevailing plaintiffs.
Constitutional doubts about such statutes 83 seem to have subsided in the
wake of judicial approval of one-way fee awards under the civil rights
84

statutes.

The civil rights cases construe statutes that are facially neutral: the
statutes authorize a fee award to the prevailingparty.8 5 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has construed this language to mean that the trial court
must ordinarily grant a fee award to the prevailing plaintiff86 and deny
one to the prevailing defendant. 87 The prevailing defendant must therefore pay his own attorney, except when the plaintiff has litigated unrea79. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). The "exceptional circumstances"
test found in several statutes also suggests a degree of discretion. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
(Supp. 11 1984) (trademark statute); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) (patent statute).
80. The judge has more limited discretion in fixing the amount of an award, which must be
"reasonable." See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party ... a reasonable attorney's fee.") (emphasis added). The legislative history of section 1988
suggests the same. "Congress has passed many statutes requiring that fees be awarded to a prevailing party. Again, the committee adopted a more moderate approach by leaving the matter to the
discretion of the judge." H.R. REP.No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). In the next paragraph
of the Report, the committee emphasized that the fee was to be "reasonable." The Senate Report
stated that the fee should be the same as paid to attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client. S.
REP.No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976). There remains discretion in the narrow sense that
when there is room for different judgments after appropriate evidence has been taken and procedures
followed, a reasonable judgment is not reversible.
81. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
82. See supra note 68.
83. See Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897) (holding that a one-way fee
shifting statute denied railroads equal protection). Ellis met with an avalanche of silence. It is the
object of considerable disdain in Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 26.
84. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
86. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
87. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (per curiam) (fees allowable only if suit frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation). Some courts have interpreted other facially neutral statutes to require two-way fee shifting, see, e.g., Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.
2d 1145, 1147-49 (Fla. 1985) (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1981)), but the one-way rule is
settled practice in civil rights cases.
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sonably or in bad faith. Even in those exceptional cases in which
defendants have obtained fee awards, courts have considered the plaintiff's relative ability to pay8s or the plaintiff's status as a socially useful
organization 9 and have forgiven or greatly reduced the fee award. The
resulting rule is usually called one-way fee shifting, because it works in
favor of the plaintiff, but not the defendant.
The Equal Access to Justice Act 9° presents a different form of oneway fee shifting: the government may be held liable, but may not assert
the liability of others, for the costs of litigation conducted without substantial justification. 9 1 This is not a distinction between plaintiff and defendant, but a distinction between government and citizen. The citizen
who prevails can recover attorney fees, whether that citizen is a prevailing plaintiff or a prevailing defendant; the government, in contrast, can
never recover attorney fees.
Under certain limited circumstances, one-way fee shifting in favor of
defendants has been permitted. The common law tort of malicious prosecution distinctly favored the prevailing defendant, who could recover
attorney fees from the plaintiff if the litigation had been motivated by
malice and brought without probable cause.92 Similar relief was not
93
available to plaintiffs subjected to malicious and improbable defenses.
C. Identifying a PrevailingParty.
1. Complexity of Winning and Losing. Many fee-shifting cases
do not involve simple two-party, single-issue lawsuits. Plaintiffs may win
some but not all of their substantive claims, receive some but not all of
the remedy sought, or attain some but not all of their collateral aims.
When they do realize their goals, it may not be by verdict and judgment,
but by settlement or by legislative or administrative action. Determining
88. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.

89. For example, in Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 709 F.2d 807, 814 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983), the court noted that the union defendant was entitled to
special consideration because it was "a non-profit association comprised primarily of members who
earn their living with their hands." The court's reduction of the award, however, seemed to be based
only on ordinary computation.

90. 5 U.S.C.A. § 504(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986) (in adversary adjudication proceedings conducted by agencies, fees shall be awarded "to a prevailing party other than the United States"); 28
U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (vest Supp. 1986) (in certain civil actions, fees shall be awarded "to a
prevailing party other than the United States").
91. Courts have applied a "reasonableness" test in determining whether the government's position was substantially justified. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
United States v. 640.00 Acres of Land, 756 F.2d 842, 849-50 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
92. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, §§ 119-120.
93. See Van Patten & Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposalfor the Tort of Malicious
Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 893 (1984).
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whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party for fee-shifting purposes is often
difficult.
Most federal courts 94 have used a "generous formulation" 95 to give
the plaintiff prevailing party status. The plaintiff is a prevailing party
under this test if he succeeds on any significant issue in the,case and
achieves some of the relief sought. 96 This test makes the plaintiff a prevailing party even if he does not win more than he loses and even if he
does not win the most important issues. Thus a plaintiff who recovers
98
only nominal damages, 97 or who wins on only one of several theories,
or who obtains only one remedy when several were demanded 99 is nonetheless a prevailing party. A plaintiff can be a prevailing party even if
others joined as plaintiffs lose entirely, I00 or even if some defendants
win.101 Although the plaintiff's losses thus do not preclude recovery of
attorney fees, they are important in determining the amount of the
award.102
94. A few have used the seemingly more stringent rule that the plaintiff must prevail on a
primary or central issue. See, eg., Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir.
1979).
95. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
96. See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (Ist Cir. 1978). The thrust of the Nadeau
test has been widely accepted. See, eg., Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 699 F.2d 309, 313 (6th Cir.
1983); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979). In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983), the Supreme Court called the Nadeau formulation "typical" and characterized it as "a
generous formulation," but did not explicitly adopt its wording as authoritative. Nevertheless, some
circuits have taken Hensley to be an approval of the "generous formula." See, e.g., Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Other courts that
originally used a more stringent rule, awarding fees only to the plaintiff who has prevailed on a
"primary" or "central" issue, have continued to do so since Hensley. See, e.g., Uviedo v. Steves Sash
& Door Co., 753 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
Unless one could consider both parties prevailing at the same time, the Nadeau rule necessarily
means that the standards for determining whether a defendant prevails must be different from the
standards for determining whether a plaintiff prevails. See, e.g., M. DERINER & A. WOLF, supra
note 10, V 8.03(2) (discussing different standards for determining prevailing plaintiff and prevailing
defendant under civil rights fee-shifting statutes).
97. See, eg., Fast v. School Dist., 728 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Rosebrough
Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 736 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 385 (1984). In Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337, 340-41 (4th Cir. 1985), the court awarded fees
for the plaintiff's successful claim that he had been denied constitutional rights, despite the fact that
the jury awarded zero damages.
98. See, e.g., Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1985); Abraham v.
Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).
99. See, eg., Mims v. Shapp, 744 F.2d 946, 955 (3d Cir. 1984).
100. See, eg., Nephew v. City of Aurora, 766 F.2d 1464, 1466 (10th Cir. 1985) (fee awarded,
though amount sought was reduced on basis that only two of the four plaintiffs prevailed).
101. See, e.g., Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, 738 F.2d 364, 368 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 784 (1985); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1984).
102. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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2. The Effect of Settlement. It is now clear that a plaintiff can be
considered a prevailing party even if the case is settled, provided some of
the relief sought is obtained.10 3 Even a settlement that is in some respects favorable to the defendant can serve as a foundation for the plaintiff's prevailing-party fee claim. 4
Fee shifting in the settlement context can be complicated by a
number of factors. The plaintiff in a civil rights suit may secure a settlement even if neither the Constitution nor any statute would have required the relief originally sought. Or, the defendant may offer in

settlement an amount it was willing to give even before the suit. In the
first instance, the plaintiff has vindicated no civil right; in the second, suit

has not caused the settlement. In neither case should the plaintiff be
entitled to a fee award. Accordingly, a settling plaintiff may be required
to show that the suit induced the settlement,10 5 and even then a defend-

ant may defeat the fee claim by showing that the plaintiff had no colora10 6
ble claim and that settlement was not based on the merits.

103. This has been true notably as to civil rights claims. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129
(1980). But some statutes may call for a different result. Under the antitrust statute, for example,
fees are due when the plaintiff recovers a judgment, but if there is a settlement the plaintiff must rely
on the common fund rule. See, ag., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 582 (3d Cir.
1984).
104. See Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979).
105. The problem typically arises in litigation in which the plaintiff seeks to reform a governmental entity's operation. When, before judgment, the entity unilaterally makes or offers to make
the reform, it is possible that its actions are based not on the suit but on other considerations. In
such cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate a "causal connection" between suit and settlement in
order to be awarded attorney fees. See Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 749 F.2d 1148,
1152 (5th Cir. 1985). Courts frequently use the word "catalyst" to describe the causal relation that
must exist between the suit and the settlement. See, e.g., Moore v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers,
Inc., 762 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Disabled in Action v. Mayor of Baltimore, 685 F.2d
881 (4th Cir. 1982), a group of disabled persons seeking better access to Baltimore's Memorial Stadium settled their claim. The city argued that it had already planned the improvements provided in
the settlement. The court said it was enough that the suit "served to a limited extent to expedite the
planning and achievement gained." Id. at 886 (quoting United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622
F.2d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 1980)). In Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (lst Cir. 1978), the court
stated that a fee award would be justified if the plaintiff's suit was a "necessary and important
factor" in achieving the improvements sought even though the accomplishment was largely attributable to constructive leadership by defendant officials. In Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638
F.2d 24, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982), the court denied fees to a plaintiff
who received in settlement only what could have been received by a presuit demand.
106. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff whose action has "no colorable, or even reasonable, likelihood of success on the merits" not
entitled to recover fees merely because of settlement); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (lst
Cir. 1978) (settled claim must not be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless).
Settlements also raise a burden-of-proof problem. Hennigan put the burden of proving a
noncolorable claim on the defendant, and put the burden of proving causation on the plaintiff. Hennigan, 749 F.2d at 1152-53. However, when a governmental defendant uses political means to provide some of the relief sought, the burden on the causation issue may be put on the defendant. See
Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1980). Courts have failed to
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A formal settlement that makes no mention of fees could be read as

waiving the fee or as embodying a final settlement of all claims,10 7 but
courts have been reluctant to interpret settlements in this fashion.108 Settlements that address the issue of attorney fees give rise to different questions: whether the plaintiff can voluntarily waive the fee award,10 9
whether the parties can negotiate fees as part of the settlement on the

merits," 0 and whether the defendant can offer a settlement conditioned

on a waiver of the fee award.' 1' These questions do not go directly to the

problem of defining the prevailing party, but they are unavoidably connected to that problem when parties consider a settlement.
address adequately many problems concerning allocation of the burden of proof in this area, and
some of their statements are rather casual.
107. See Jennings v. Metropolitan Gov't, 715 F.2d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir. 1983),
108. Courts have dealt with the problem in different ways. Some have ordered fee awards without mentioning the problem. See, eg., Bonnes v. Long, 651 F.2d 214, 219 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 961 (1982). Some have treated the silence as an evidentiary issue. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, 735 F.2d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 1984); Chicano Police
Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 132 (10th Cir. 1980). Some courts have held that the fee
claim is not barred unless the settlement contains a specific written waiver. See, e.g., El Club Del
Barrio v. United Community Corps., 735 F.2d 98, 100-01 (3d Cir. 1984).
109. The Supreme Court has stated that district courts have discretion to approve fee waivers in
negotiated settlements of certain civil rights actions, where a fee award under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), might otherwise be appropriate. See Evans
v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1545 (1986).
110. The court in Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1977), recognized the possibility that any "negotiated" fee allocation in a class action settlement could simply
reflect acquiescence by the defendant to an unconscionably high fee for the plaintiffs' attorneys.
Finding this prospect intolerable, the court held that it was necessary to have a complete settlement
on the merits, followed by a separate negotiation for fees. Id. at 1021. This approach arguably
creates uncertainty that may discourage any settlement by the defendant, who would be hesitant to
settle one portion of the case when extensive liabilities might still be imposed with respect to another
portion. Thus, if the court sees no danger of a "sweetheart" agreement, it should let the fee settlement stand. See Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 905 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1798
(1986). Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved simultaneous negotiation of fees and merits in civil
rights actions. See Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1543 n.30 (1986).
111. In Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986), the defendant offered to settle a class action on
behalf of institutionalized children provided the plaintiffs would waive the fee claim. The plaintiffs'
lawyer initially agreed, but sought to avoid the waiver when the settlement was before the court for
approval. The district court approved the entire settlement, but the court of appeals invalidated the
fee waiver, and remanded for a determination of an appropriate fee award notwithstanding the
waiver. Id. at 1536. The court of appeals noted that federal policy strongly favored an award of fees
to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions and pointed out that the settlement offer placed the
plaintiffs' lawyer in an inescapable conflict of interest. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and held
that the district court had authority to approve the settlement, including the fee waiver. Id. at 1545.
The Court found nothing in the language or legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act that indicated congressional intent to ban all fee waivers. Id. at 1538-40. The Court
pointed out that it was within-the district court's discretion to accept or reject the proposed settlement, but not, as the court of appeals' action suggested, to rewrite the settlement for the parties by
accepting the settlement on the merits but imposing its own determination as to the fee award. Id. at
1537.
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Relief Outside the Forum: Politicaland Administrative Relief.

When a plaintiff seeking structural reform sues a public entity, legislative
or administrative action may moot judicial relief. In such cases, the
plaintiff can recover attorney fees as a prevailing party even though, as in
the case of settlements, no controversy has been adjudicated and it has

not been shown that the defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights. The
courts have insisted, however, that the plaintiff show that the lawsuit was
a catalyst to or a partial cause of the legislative or administrative ac-

tion, 112 and that the claim was at least colorable on the merits."

3

Some-

times it is required that the plaintiff have sought vindication in another
forum, either as a prerequisite to asserting the fee-justifying claim, or as a
collateral part of pursuing that claim. In such cases, a prevailing plaintiff
may be awarded attorney fees for work outside the forum;" 4 indeed, success outside the forum may even count to give the plaintiff prevailing
party status in the first place.1 15 The rules in this area are somewhat

technical, and there are instances in which a court will deny the plaintiff
any fee award for work outside the forum."
4. Success on the Merits.

6

As the above discussion implies, the

plaintiff is not "prevailing" until he succeeds on the merits in some fashion. Purely procedural success is not enough; for example, success in
persuading a judge to deny a defense motion for summary judgment does
not make the plaintiff a prevailing party. 1 7 And a plaintiff who obtains
112. See, eg., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 916 (3d Cir.
1985); DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1982).
113. Although the focus has often been on causation, it seems clear that the plaintiff's success in
the nonjudicial forum must vindicate the right in question. See Coen v. Harrison County School
Bd., 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]t is enough that [the plaintiff's] suit has served to vindicate
his ights.... ."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir.
1980) (when administrative decision to abandon contested regulation was direct result of plaintiff's
suit, plaintiff is a prevailing party).
114. See Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 1982) (fee award included
compensation for time spent attempting to achieve administrative relief designed to move legal action towards disposition), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
115. See Crest St. Community Council, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 769 F.2d 1025,
1028-29 (4th Cir. 1985) (administrative work and work in state court in separate suit), cert. granted,
106 S. Ct. 784 (1986); Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 103-04 (7th Cir. 1985) (work in state court
after federal abstention).
116. Some prelitigation work, such as drafting pleadings, is clearly a part of the case and subject
to a fee award. Prelitigation work in an administrative proceeding may be subject to a fee award if
such work is a precondition to suit. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 60-65
(1980). Work in an administrative proceeding that is not a precondition to suit is not compensable.
See Webb v. Board of Educ., 105 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1985) (no recovery of fees expended by teacher
in pursuing negotiations with school board after his termination).
117. See, eg., Hanrahan v. Hampson, 446 U.S. 754, 756-59 (1980) (fact that court reversed
directed verdict in favor of defendants and remanded for trial on merits did not make plaintiff a
prevailing plaintiff).
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some affirmative relief without any determination on the merits-a preliminary injunction, for instance-is not a prevailing party and is not
18
entitled to a fee award.
But a plaintiff may receive a fee award after prevailing on the merits
in some fashion even though the suit has not proceeded to final judg-

ment. Such awards are deemed especially appropriate in cases that consume months or years. Once the plaintiff has established that the
defendant school district is operating a segregated system of public education, for example, an interim fee award may be appropriate; the plaintiff is considered a prevailing party as to that amount.' 9 The court

might then order supplemental awards as it resolves further issues on the
merits.
Although the plaintiff must succeed on the merits on at least one
issue, the plaintiff need not have directed all the work for which a fee

award is made toward the successful issue. For example, after an injunction has been ordered, the plaintiff may want to monitor the defendant's

compliance. Such posttrial work is fully compensable.

20

Courts have

been reluctant, however, to grant fee awards for demonstrably unsuccess12 1
ful postjudgment ancillary work.

Finally, the plaintiff may assert several theories in a single suit, only
some of which would justify a fee award if successful. In civil rights

cases the fee-justifying claim often raises both constitutional and nonconstitutional issues. Under the familiar practice of avoiding constitutional

issues, a court may rule for the plaintiff on a nonconstitutional theory
that does not carry a fee award. Although the plaintiff in such a case has
not succeeded on the fee-justifying issue, the plaintiff is still regarded as a
122
prevailing party.
118. See, eg., Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 777 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 2252 (1986); Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 352-53 (4th Cir. 1980). Cf
Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1977) (fees
for interlocutory appeal denied in discretion of court). But cf Deerfield Medical Center v. City of
Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 339 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (granting fees for interlocutory
appeal); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1131 (9th Cir. 1974) (same).
119. See, eg., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 309496 (1986); Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 721-23 (1974); Hameed v. International
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 637 F.2d 506, 522-24 (8th Cir. 1980).
120. See, eg., Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738-39 (1st Cir. 1984); Willie M. v. Hunt, 732
F.2d 383, 387 (4th Cir. 1984).
121. See, e-g., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 920 (3d Cir.
1985) (no fee award for work after "last benefit" was earned); Willie M. v. Hunt, 732 F.2d 383, 38687 (4th Cir. 1984) (no fee award for unsuccessful postjudgment litigation over meaning of consent
judgment).
122. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 128-29 (1980); Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d
1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985). But a fee award may be denied if the relationship between the pretermit-
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5. LiabilityLimited to Losers. The Supreme Court has construed
statutes that do not specify who is to pay the fee award to mean that the
losing party is to pay. 12 3 When there are several parties on each side of a
dispute, determining who is to be considered a loser as well as who is to
be considered a winner may become complicated. Yet the principle that
only a loser should be liable to pay the winner's fee seems fundamental

and compelling when fee liability is based neither on fault nor on benefit

to the defendant. 124 In such cases a prevailing plaintiff can justly claim a
fee only if the defendant is shown to have violated the plaintiff's rights in
some way. Thus a plaintiff who has obtained a preliminary injunction
without any determination on the merits has obtained valuable relief, but
since this entails no showing that the defendant has actually violated a
right, a fee award against the defendant would be unjustified. 12 5 It is also
doubtful whether an intervenor who did not violate the plaintiff's rights
in the first place, but who merely intervened in support of a losing defendant, should be considered a losing party even though the plaintiff
126
prevails on his contentions.
D.

Status of Parties and Lawyers-Disentitlementsand Immunities.

1. Status of the Lawyer. In a few instances the status of the plaintiff's attorney has figured in the question whether to award fees. Defendants have argued that when the plaintiff is assisted by lawyers who are
paid by public appropriations, no fee award should be made. The courts
have generally rejected this argument 127 and have ordered compensation
ted constitutional claim and the nonconstitutional claim is merely tenuous. See Lund v. Affieck, 587
F.2d 75, 77 (Ist Cir. 1978).
If one of two claims carries a fee right and the other does not, a plaintiff who prevails on both
might find the fee award reduced because a portion of the lawyer's work related to the nonfee claim.
The court in Williams v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121, 136 (3d Cir. 1984), remanded for
such a determination. Many cases involving both fee and nonfee claims have not recognized this
problem.
123. See Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3104 (1985).
124. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
126. But courts have allowed fee awards against intervenors who are not responsible for the
relief and who did not cause the problem in the first place. See Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d
128, 132-33 (6th Cir. 1979) (fee assessed against intervenor who unsuccessfully advanced alternative
desegregation plan); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268,
1272-73 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (fee assessed against intervenor on behalf of city in challenge to city
abortion ordinance). Cf. May v. Cooperman, 578 F. Supp. 1308, 1317-18 (D.N.J. 1984) (fee assessed
against intervenors representing legislature that had passed unconstitutional statute), aff'd on the
merits, appeal dismissed as to fee award, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
127. See Lund v. Affieck, 587 F.2d 75, 76 (1st Cir. 1978); Akron Center for Reproductive Health
v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (N.D. Ohio 1984); see also Note, Awards of Attorney's
Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARv. L. REv. 411 (1973) (supporting fee awards to legal aid offices).
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at market rates. 128 Similarly, courts have made full fee awards to public
interest lawyers who are paid compensatory salaries by a foundation or
public interest group. 129

Pro se litigants who have pursued their own claims without the help
of professional lawyers have fared differently. Even if the pro se litigant

has fully prevailed, a fee award generally will be denied. 130 But some
courts have awarded fees to pro se litigants, who are also professionally
qualified lawyers. 131 Courts might view fee claims based on bad faith

more favorably, or they might find awards to pro se litigants permissible
1 32
under some statutes but not under others.

2. Public Entities and Officers-Immunities. Unless a litigant
sidesteps the eleventh amendment, state governments cannot be made to
pay fee awards.133 This protection does not extend to local public enti-

ties, however. Thus school boards, cities, and other local entities can be
made to pay fee awards on the same basis as other litigants.134

A civil rights plaintiff, however, can probably avoid the bar of the
eleventh amendment. Since Congress has the power to provide for enforcement of the fourteenth amendment, and has enacted fee liability
statutes pursuant to that power, the eleventh amendment provides no

shield against fee liability when the claim is grounded ultimately in the
128. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 889 (1984).
129. See, eg., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 602 (Ist Cir.) (salary of lawyer not a factor
to be considered in fixing fee), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
130. See Owens-El v. Robinson, 694 F.2d 941, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1982) (pro se prisoner civil rights
claim). This rule is based on a number of objections. One objection is that pro se litigants risk their
case and the public good that is supposed to flow from it when they do not retain counsel, Other
objections are that pro se litigants lack detached perspective and that their fee award would be
difficult to compute. See Note, ProSe Can You Sue? Attorney Feesfor Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 659, 669-77 (1982).
131. See, eg., Duncan v. Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1985); Cazalas v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1983). But see Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d
646, 647-48 (6th Cir. 1983) (no fee award), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908 (1984); White v. Arlen Realty
& Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388-89 (4th Cir.) (lawyer representing himself lacked perspective and
detachment, and thereby added costs to the trial; no fee award), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980).
132. Compare Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1983)
(fee award granted to pro se litigant, an attorney, in action based on Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)) with White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388-89 (4th Cir.) (no
fee award to pro se litigant, an attorney, in action based on Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(3)), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980).
133. See generally Note, Attorneys' Feesand the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. RzV. 1875
(1975).
134. See, eg., Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 543 (6th Cir. 1976) (county boards of
education liable for fee award), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Lytle v, Commissioners of Election, 541 F.2d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 1976) (county 6lections board liable for fee award), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 904 (1978).
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fourteenth amendment. 135 It is not clear whether other congressional fee
authorizations, passed pursuant to some other constitutional provision,
could constitutionally thrust aside the eleventh amendment to impose

liability upon the states.1 36 Even if they could, it is not clear that the fee
provisions would be read to do so.137
When a public officer is sued in a purely official capacity, the suit is
treated as an action against the state, and ordinary eleventh amendment
principles apply.' 38 Most officers in the executive branch enjoy only
qualified immunity in damages actions brought against them in a personal capacity, and accordingly are liable for actions in bad faith.' 39 A
similar principle applies in civil rights cases, 14° and officers subject to
damages claims are also subject to liability for fee awards. 14 1 If a plaintiff

fails to recover anything on the merits because of an officer's immunity,
however, there is no fee liability. 142
135. See, eg., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978) (state liable for fee awards under
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988; no eleventh amendment immunity); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976) (state liable for fee award under title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); no eleventh amendment immunity).
136. In Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979), the court awarded attorney
fees authorized under the copyright statute in a copyright action against the state. The court reasoned that the Constitution specifically authorized Congress to enact copyright laws, and hence,
though the article I copyright clause antedated the eleventh amendment, it nevertheless limited its
effect. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1283-85. See also Johnson v. University of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321,
324 (D. Va. 1985) (copyright legislation waives eleventh amendment immunity from liability for
copyright infringements). An earlier decision, Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1962),
interposed eleventh amendment immunity in a copyright case. But Wihtol was decided before Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), both of which were
relied on in Mills Music. Wihtol also conferred the state's eleventh amendment immunity upon a
school district. Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 782.
137. If it is accepted that the Constitution permits Congress to constrict the eleventh amendment
in certain cases, it remains an issue whether Congress has in fact done so in a given case. Fee awards
statutes do not specify the state's liability, so there is a question of construction. The majority in
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978), construed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of
1976 to cover states because the Act was addressed to "any" action to enforce civil rights and because the underlying right was aimed specifically at state action. Mills Music suggests that the
specificity of the constitutional authorization is important. While commerce clause enactments
might require Congress to declare state liability explicitly, fourteenth amendment or copyright
clause enactments would not. See Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1285.
138. See Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105-07 (1985).
139. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, § 132, at 1059.
140. In civil rights cases, however, officers may be liable for actions that were objectively unreasonable, whether or not there was subjective bad faith. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092,
1096 (1986) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
141. See Gibbs v. Town of Frisco City, 626 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1980). Indeed, officers
may be liable for fees even when they are not liable for damages. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
142. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1984) ("There is no indication ... that Congress intended to provide for a fee award if the official was immune from the underlying relief on
which the award was premised.").

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1986:435

Some officers, notably judges and legislators, enjoy absolute immunity in carrying out judicial and legislative tasks within their jurisdic-

tions. 14 3 Judges engaged in nonjudicial tasks that are executive in nature
may, however, be held liable for the fee award as well as on the merits. 144
In addition, judges and legislators may be subjected to injunctions; in
such instances, there is liability for any fee award appropriate on the

facts. 145 Legislators have also been held responsible for fee awards in
cases in which they have intervened and taken an active role in the
litigation. 146
E. Allocation of Fee Liability Among Parties.
1. Joint and Several Liability. If two or more defendants are liable for damages 14 7 in a statutory1 48 fee award case, the court must decide
whether to levy the fee award severally or jointly and severally. One can
plausibly argue that if the defendants are jointly and severally liable for
the damages awarded on the merits, they should be jointly and severally
liable for the fee award. Indeed, some cases support this position. t49 But
143. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732-35 (1980).
144. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978) (immunity attaches only to "judicial
act").
145. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543-44 (1984).
146. See May v. Cooperman, 578 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D.N.J. 1984) (no immunity where state
legislators "abandoned their legislative role and took on a quasi-enforcement role by intervening to
defend the statute"), aff'd on the merits, appeal dismissed as to fee award, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.

1985).
147. Many civil rights cases seek only injunctive relief and relief incidental to that. Defendants
in such cases are often only formal parties. It is very difficult to speak ofjoint and several liability on
the merits of such cases. If there is no joint and several liability on the merits of the case, joint and
several liability for the fee award would seem to be justified only as to parties who had it in their
legal power to settle out of the case or who litigated vexatiously and in concert, or vexatiously in
such a way as to cause a single, indivisible injury.
148. In common fund cases the liability for a fee is based on benefits received; hence joint and
several liability is inappropriate. In the substantial benefit cases, however, the benefit is nonmonetary and perhaps fictional. These cases are often private attorney general cases in disguise, and as
such they resemble the statutory fee cases. Bad faith or vexatious litigation cases justify a fee because of fault in the litigation process itself. They thus resemble cases involving the problem of joint
and several liability for punitive damages; since punishment is by nature individualized, joint and
several liability for bad faith fee awards would be justified only when there is evidence of joint bad
faith. For simplification, the textual analysis is limited to ordinary statutory cases.
149. In Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 712 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1983), the court
explicitly assessed joint and several liability for fees without stating a rationale. Courts have often
rendered or upheld joint and several judgments using language that does not distinguish fee claims
from claims on the merits. Joint and several fee liability is supported inferentially in a number of
cases. See Smith v. Updegraff, 744 F.2d 1354, 1368 (8th Cir. 1984); Contract Admin. Trust Fund v.
Uriarte Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 194
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985); Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth
R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 1983); Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 521 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979); see also Jennings v. Metropolitan Gov't, 715 F.2d Il 11,
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the issue demands more serious consideration, partly because its complexities have not been explored and partly because there may be some
150
confusion about even the basic rules of joint and several liability.
Courts impose joint and several liability either when there is concert
of action or when two or more defendants acting independently cause a
single, indivisible injury. The effect of joint and several liability is to
make each defendant liable for the entire judgment, though the plaintiff
cannot collect twice. 15 1 Joint and several liability puts the risk of one
defendant's insolvency on a codefendant rather than on the plaintiff.
Joint and several liability for the fee award would, therefore, favor the
plaintiff when one defendant has only limited assets.
Joint and several liability for the plaintiff's fee might seem especially
appropriate when multiple defendants are represented jointly. But the
prospect of such liability can create a conflict of interest for the attorney
representing multiple defendants, because the attorney's decision to increase litigation with respect to a separate interest of one defendant
would increase the joint fee liability of the others.
If the defense is not conducted jointly, the efforts of different defendants might generate different levels of litigation by the plaintiff, and
hence different defendants would generate different portions of the plaintiff's fee award. If any identifiable portion of the plaintiff's fee arises
from work not directed at defendant B, then B probably should not be
held jointly and severally liable for that portion of the fee.
On the other hand, joint and several liability for the plaintiff's fee is
presumptively sound if the plaintiff presents a unified case against all defendants. In such a case, it might seem that the defendant who claims to
be liable only for a discrete portion of the fee award should have the
burden of showing that his litigation generated only a specific, identifiable portion of the plaintiff's litigation expense. 152 But fee liability is not
entirely analogous to liability on the merits. Causation with respect to
the initial harm and causation with respect to the fee costs are arguably
wholly separate matters. Moreover, fee liability may chill access to
courts. In the case of fee aWards, the burden of proof arguably should be
on the plaintiff-the party with the best access to records of fees gener1114 (6th Cir. 1983) (joint and several fee liability appropriate if findings supported joint and several
liability on merits).
150. Several cases indicate that there is considerable misunderstanding of these rules at the trial
court level. See, e.g., Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Updegraff,
744 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (8th Cir. 1984).
151. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, § 52, at 345.
152. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965) (burden on defendant to show
plaintiff's injury is divisible and apportionable to each tortfeasor).
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ated-to show that all of the work for which the fee is claimed was aimed

at both defendants.
2. Contribution and Allocation Among Defendants. Defendants
held jointly and severally liable for fees may seek contribution. The idea
behind contribution is that one tortfeasor who pays more than a fair

share is entitled to claim contribution from others who are also jointly
and severally liable. In cases involving several liability, courts make a

"fair share" allocation among tortfeasors in the first instance. "Fair

15 3
share" in contribution cases originally implied an equal allocation.
Courts adopting comparative negligence standards, however, have held it

to mean comparative fault share. 154 In cases involving strict liability,
when fault is theoretically not an issue, it has sometimes meant something like comparative causation share.' 55
It is not clear that any of these rules is adaptable to attorney fees.
Some fee award cases involve fault on the part of defendants, others do
not. 156 Sometimes the named defendant is the one person who is clearly
not at fault.' 57 Sometimes when two public entities are sued for enforc-

ing an unconstitutional law, one of them litigates fiercely and the other
does no more than it must. 5 8 And sometimes a party who intervenes
153. See Leflar, Contributionand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 13031(1982).
154. See, eg., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 587, 578 P.2d 899,
904, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 187 (1978).
155. When the acts of two defendants have different levels of causal significance with regard to a
single injury, courts may apportion liability on a comparative causation basis. Because "comparative
causation" is not widely recognized as a term of art, courts in such cases sometimes use the term
"comparative fault." See, eg., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 328-32, 579 P.2d
441, 444-46, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553-55 (1978) (supermarket whose fault contributed 80% toward
accident liable for 80% of award, cart manufacturer liable for 20% of award); see also Rizzo &
Arnold, CausalApportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399
(1980) (proposing method for apportioning liability in accordance with relative causal contributions
of tortfeasors).
156. In employment discrimination cases, for example, good faith is no defense to the claim on
the merits, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1975), or to the fee claim, To
recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), for a deprivation of property without due process of law, a
plaintiff is required to show that the deprivation was a "deliberate decision" of a government official.
See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986). Again, however, good faith is no defense. See
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (city liable for wrongful termination of
police chief, notwithstanding good faith).
157. See, e.g., In re Kansas Congressional Dists. Reapportionment Cases, 745 F.2d 610, 611-12
(10th Cir. 1984) (defendant secretary of state agreed that current districts were unconstitutional but
had no power to cure problem).
158. See, e.g., Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 960 (1st Cir. 1984) (state liquor
control agency assessed higher percentage of fees than local agency because state agency's support of
unconstitutional regulation was more vigorous).
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had nothing to do with the plaintiff's injury in the first place.1 59 These
examples suggest that ultimate responsibility for the fee is not necessarily
related to the conduct that governs the merits of the case. Thus courts
should not mechanically apply the rule prohibiting contribution among
intentional tortfeasors1 60 in the fee award context.
Case discussion of the problem has been quite limited. However,
courts have allocated fee charges to a single defendant if that defendant
has clearly generated those charges. 16 1 And in cases involving intervenors, courts might similarly allocate fee liability on the basis of the added
work the intervenor caused.1 62 In other cases involving multiple defendants, courts could analyze the comparative vigor with which each defendant litigated.1 63 Alternatively, courts could allocate the fee liability
in equal shares, or on the basis of comparative responsibility for the original injury. 164 A court might even use some combination of these allocation schemes.1 65 Finally, it should be noted that courts have been willing
to allocate fee liability in part on the basis of ability to pay or ability to
spread the costs, 166 considerations that may have a rather different significance in the case of a public entity defendant than in the case of a badfaith plaintiff.
Allocation on the basis of joint and several liability may be deemed
inconsistent with the Hensley v. Eckerhart167 principle that a court must
take the plaintiff's success into account when fixing the fee award.1 68 In
multiple defendant cases, this rule would seem to require that the degree
of success against each defendant should be taken into account. Thus
Hensley may eliminate the possibility of adopting joint and several liability except where the plaintiff succeeds against the defendants in substantially equal degree.
159. See, e.g., Hayeraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1979) (intervenor opposing
desegregation plan); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1275,

1279 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (intervenors supporting constitutionality of abortion ordinance).
160. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 48, § 50, at 339.
161. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
162. See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1275, 1294
(N.D. Ohio 1985).
163. See, e.g., Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 960 (1st Cir. 1984).
164. See, eg., Burney v. Housing Auth., 735 F.2d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 1984).
165. See, ag., Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 959-60 (1st Cir. 1984) (comparing
both the respective responsibility of the defendants for the offense and the respective involvement of
the defendants in the litigation); Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (remaining fees divided equally among all principal defendants after initial allocation of certain fees to party solely responsible for generating them).
166. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see infra note 193 and accompanying text.
167. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
168. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
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CALCULATING THE FEE

Goals in Calculatingthe Fee.

Calculating the fee to be awarded is perhaps the most significant and
most difficult problem in the world of fee awards. The statutes that authorize fee awards require that the fee be "reasonable."' 69 The problem
has been to infuse the "reasonable fee" formula with enough principled
content so that fee claims can be evenhandedly adjudicated without fullscale litigation. At the same time, not only must the fee award provide
adequate compensation in fact, but it must also be available with suffi170
cient certainty to induce the lawyer to take the case in the first place.
These goals conflict with each other, and the tendency has been to compromise each of them. The result in practice has been lamentable and

disheartening.
B. Basic Approaches to Calculatingthe Fee.
1. Methods of Charging Clients. Market considerations aside,
lawyers use several distinctly different methods to fix their fees. The fee

may be based on a percentage of recovery or of assets being managed, a
flat amount for an entire case or for particular legal services, or the hours

worked multiplied by a predetermined rate.171 These different methods
originated as methods for charging one's own client, but they have been

used in the fee award cases to assess fee liability. Although courts generally adhere to an hourly fee charge as the basic method because it is most
consistent with the compensatory theory of fee awards, they continue to

fall back on highly subjective factors that have roots in the percentage
72
method and the flat fee method.'

2. Percentage Recoveries.

Influenced by contingent fee practice

in areas involving high damages claims, some courts have evaluated the
fee award in terms of a percentage of the recovery.

73

This can result in

169. See supra note 80.
170. See, e-g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.4 (1983) (courts should award fees
"adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do not produce windfalls to attorneys").
171. Hourly billing is most common today. See Kritzer, supra note 10, at 565 n.16 (noting that
over half of surveyed attorneys billed on hourly basis). A generation ago, it was more common to fix
fees in advance. Percentage fees were common in probate and collections cases. Some of the old
minimum fee schedules, for instance, do not even mention hourly rates. See, e.g., Bench and BarMinimum Fee Bills, 12 MINN. L. REV. 199, 202-05 (1928). Others list hourly fees, but their importance is overshadowed by the numerous flat fee and contingent fee charges. See, e.g., Note, Minimum Fee Schedules: Are They Worthwhile?, 40 IOWA L. REv. 642, 645-47 (1955).
172. See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text.
173. See Berger, supra note 10, at 287 & n.31. In recent times, however, pure percentage-ofrecovery calculations have generally been rejected. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, vestiges of the percentage approach remain.
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very high fee awards in some cases. 174 In other cases, however, this approach can result in awards that do not represent fair compensation. 175
Such would be the case where only injunctive relief is available or where
damages are necessarily limited because the only right at issue is an in176
tangible one. This occurs frequently in the civil rights context.
Although some courts may continue to give percentage assessments dominant weight without saying SO, 1 7 7 appellate courts have held that percentages alone cannot be used to calculate the fee award.178 Similarly,
fee awards that must be reduced for some reason cannot be reduced by a
stated percentage, 79 and even the plaintiff's own contingent fee contract
will not necessarily provide a guide for calculating the fee award. i80 But
the cases indicate that when the percentage approach is beaten back in
8
one place, it tends to crop up in another.' '
174. There is some evidence that lawyers generally do not invest more time in a case as the
stakes go up, and that many large cases in fact involve quite limited expenditures of time. See
Kritzer, supra note 10, at 567. This evidence is rather incomplete because it is not correlated with
degree of success actually achieved or with the likelihood of success as estimated at the time the
decision to limit time investment was made. Still, the evidence strongly suggests that there are many
instances of high recoveries with minimal time investment. To the extent that this is true, a fiat
percentage fee at any of the conventional percentage levels would very likely overcompensate.
175. Cf Easley v. Empire Inc., 757 F.2d 923, 931-32 (8th Cir. 1985) (approving fee award of
$30,000 where contingent percentage fee on which lawyer had taken case would have been only

$900).
176. In the civil rights context, there is also the risk that a jury or even a court will express its
dissatisfaction with the civil rights claim by returning a low award. Prisoner rights cases are natural
examples of this phenomenon. See Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 1985) (jury
refused to award prisoner even nominal damages though denial of access to prison library violated
his rights). It seems harsh indeed to deny a fee award when the lawyer has pursued a right that was
actually established and vindicated.
177. A great deal is hidden in fee calculations. Trial judges have used vague and conclusory
findings, claimed personal familiarity with the work of counsel, and claimed discretion to insulate fee
awards from review. As one federal district court has said:
[T]he trial judge is cast adrift in a sea ofjudicial discretion.... [T]he process of arriving at
the precise multiplier is more a function of gestalt than cerebration. In the instant case I
add to my knowledge of the plaintiff and the amount of the verdict and the time, stress, and
energy expended by counsel, a sense of what is appropriate.., based upon my own participation in similar cases as a trial lawyer.
Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 272, 279 (D. Colo. 1981). Appellate courts
have come to insist on better fact finding and articulation of reasons underlying fee awards. See, e.g.,
Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1137 (1lth Cir. 1984). Still, the trial judge
can manipulate the findings to support a predetermined percentage result.
178. See Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 85-86 (Ist Cir. 1984) ("[A] 'reasonable'
counsel fee cannot be equated reflexively with a percentage of the dollar recovery.").
179. See Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting inappropriateness of arbitrary 50% reduction of claimed amount except in small cases), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3500 (1985).
180. See Easley v. Empire Inc., 757 F.2d 923, 932 (8th Cir. 1985) (contingent fee contract places
no ceiling on fee award); Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 1984) (court
should disregard the existence of a private fee arrangement).
181. See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
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Subjective Factors.

a. Originsof the FactorsAnalysis. The most influential method of
fee award computation requires courts to consider a large number of factors, none of which is quantified. This approach to fee awards may be
derived from the lawyer's practice of setting flat fees per case or for a
given type of legal service.1 82 Market pressures aside, the lawyer setting
a fee in this manner would presumably consider several factors. The
American Bar Association's 1908 Canons of Ethics provided a list of factors to be considered in fixing a fee.' 83 This list, with some modifications,
84
continues to provide guidelines for the practitioner. ,
Despite the fact that this list of factors was meant to guide the lawyer in setting his fee and not to guide a court in fixing the amount of a fee
award, it was used for precisely that purpose by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express.'8 5 Under the Johnson approach, consideration is to be given to
such factors as the novelty of the case, the amount of time and labor
expended, the attorney's skill, the customary fee, the attorney's prior relationship with the client, and the amount involved.186 The Johnson approach has been influential in fee award cases in the civil rights
context' 87 and elsewhere. 188
b. Objections to the Factors Approach. The factors approach
probably provided adequate guidelines in the situation for which it was
evidently intended-aiding lawyers in setting their own fees. In that context, the shortcomings of the factors approach could be overlooked be182. See supra note 171.
183. See CANONS OF ETHIcS Canon 12, reprintedin 33 A.B.A. REP. 575, 578 (1908).
184. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983); see also infra note

186.
185. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).

186. The ABA version lists eight elements:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood ... that the
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed... ; (6) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer ... ; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983). The Johnson list includes two
factors not in the ABA list: the undesirability of the case and the amount of fees awarded in similar
cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 719.
187. See, eg., NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1984).

188. See Harman v. Levin, 772 F.2d 1150, 1152 & n.l (4th Cir. 1985) (Johnson factors applied in
bankruptcy proceeding); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (Johnson factors applied in union member's suit against union), cert. denied, 425 U.S, 951 (1976).
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cause market factors would operate as a constraint. Such is not the case
when courts use the factors to determine the amount of a fee award.
The chief problem with the factors approach is that courts have had
little guidance as to what significance they should give the individual factors in calculating the award. The Johnson list was merely illustrative of
the types of factors courts should consider in appropriate circumstances.
There is no apparent logic behind the organization of the list; the factors
are presented as if they were all different and all of equal importance,
when in fact they are neither. Some courts have tended to view the Johnson list as a check list, reciting the various factors without analyzing their
individual relevance. 18 9 Other courts have introduced additional factors,
confusing matters even more.1 90
When courts use the Johnson factors as a check list, they overlook
the fact that some factors are important only as evidence of others. For
example, the novelty of the case is undoubtedly important because novel
issues demand more time and skill. Time and skill in turn are important
in determining the customary fee, another factor in the list. Because
some factors overlap, courts using the Johnson list may at times make
unjust fee awards. 19 1
A further problem may arise when courts purport to consider all the
Johnson factors without taking note of the context in which the fee
award is made. Under Johnson, a court may consider the amount involved in the action as one factor that should influence the fee award. In
the civil rights context, however, the amount involved has no real
relevance.192
The popularity of the factors approach may encourage other courts
to consider factors not mentioned in Johnson. The Johnson list of factors
does not include the financial situation of the plaintiff, but some courts
have cited the plaintiff's relative lack of wealth as a ground for reducing
the fee award to which a prevailing defendant would otherwise be enti189. See, e.g., Davis v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (remanding for lower

court to explain the award calculation; lower court claimed to have "consider[ed] all the relevant
factors," but did not explain how individual factors influenced sum awarded).
190. See, eg., Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1979) (reducing
fee award on basis of plaintiff's financial distress).
191. See, e.g., In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 25 Bankr. 747, 760-61 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (substituting appellate panel's assessment of fee award, $170,000, for bankruptcy court's assessment,
$83,000, because bankruptcy court's "incorrect application of redundant Johnson criteria... produced a skewed determination").
192. Cf. Note, Surveying the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1293, 1311 n. 116 (1984) (noting that the "length of attorney-client relationship" factor conflicts with section 1988 goal of assisting persons unable to afford legal
assistance).
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tled. 193 The justification for considering this factor is questionable. Insofar as a defendant must establish some form of litigation misconduct to
recover attorney fees from a losing plaintiff, courts' attention to a plaintiff's wealth may go beyond what is required to maintain appropriate
incentives. Moreover, this factor introduces further asymmetry into
courts' treatment of plaintiffs and defendants-courts do not reduce the
fee liability of a defendant to a prevailing plaintiff on the basis that the
194
plaintiff enjoys a strong financial position.
In practice, the use of the factors approach has resulted in a highly
subjective system of fee awards. It is easy to see the potential for abuse,
either through double-counting or through consideration of factors in
inappropriate contexts. Under the factors approach, fee awards cannot
be predicted with any degree of certainty, and the results are difficult to
195
evaluate.
c. PotentialUtility of the FactorsMethod. It might be possible to
use the Johnson factors as an aid in estimating the market value of the
lawyer's services. In damages or condemnation cases, market value controls.1 96 Determining market value frequently involves taking expert
opinion evidence in the form of a conclusion. 197 Ordinarily that conclusion is supported or attacked by examining the factors on which it was
based. These factors merely assist the trier of fact in determining
whether the conclusion about market value-the ultimate matter at issue-is sound. Conceivably courts could use the Johnson factors to the
same end, in which case the ultimate conclusion would have at least
some relationship to the market value of the lawyer's services. But in
fact courts have not used these factors in this way. Instead of using them
as evidence bearing on an empirical estimate by a witness familiar with
the market, they have used them as tests of abstract reasonableness.
d. Lingering Influence of the FactorsApproach. The Johnson approach to fixing fee awards enjoyed much popularity, perhaps because it
193. See, eg., Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1979) ($2,500 fee
award reduced to $200 because of plaintiff's financial distress); cf Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683,
697-98 (7th Cir. 1985) (fee award not reduced since plaintiff could not establish his indigency).
194. See, eg., Duncan v. Poythress, 750 F.2d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.) ("Plaintiff's counsel is not
denied fees under section 1988 merely because the plaintiff is able to pay for counsel .
), vacated,
reh'g granted, 756 F.2d 1981 (1lth Cir. 1985) (en banc).
195. See Berger, supra note 10, at 286 (noting tendency of courts to give lip service to factors,
but to jump from unsystematic analysis of factors to unexplained lump-sum fee award figure).
196. See D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 143.
197. See id. § 3.4, at 158-61.
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gave judges a high degree of control 98 and required neither hard analysis
nor any actual proof of facts about market value. In theory, at least, an
approach to fee fixing based on hourly billing rates has supplanted the
Johnson approach. In professing adherence to the hourly market rate
approach, however, courts have not rejected the factors approach altogether. The nonmarket, subjective approach taken in Johnson still influences courts which in theory apply the hourly market-rate analysis.
4. The Lodestar or Market Method-Hourly Charges. Shortly
btfore Johnson laid down its twelve factors, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a radically different approach. In
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp. (Lindy 1),199 the court held that the chief determinant of a fee
award was the market value of the attorney's services. Lindy I provided
the formula Johnson lacked. It required the trier to determine the
number of hours reasonably spent in providing legal services and to multiply this number by a reasonable hourly rate. 20 0 The resulting figure was
the "lodestar of the court's fee determination."'20 This approach, which
the Supreme Court later embraced, 20 2 differs radically from the Johnson
approach both operationally and in principle. Operationally, it calls for a
different and more objective kind of proof. In principle, it is grounded
specifically in the market value of the property in question-the lawyer's
services.
Courts often award "general damages" in terms of market value of
property. 20 3 Thus a plaintiff who is entitled to property is entitled to its
market value when the property is destroyed; this principle applies
whether or not the plaintiff would actually have used the property or
benefited from it in any way. 2°4 A market value approach in fee cases
yields similar results. A court should calculate the fee based on the market value of the legal services rendered, even if the plaintiff did not pay
198. See, eg., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 921 (3d Cir.
1985) (applying Johnson factors and reducing fee award because plaintiff was not 100% successful,
then augmenting award because quality of lawyer's work was high).
199. 487 F.2d 161, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1973).
200. Id. at 167.
201. Id. at 168.
202. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 899-900 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433
(1983). The Supreme Court may have some reservations, however. See infra notes 211-21 and
accompanying text.
203. See D. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 138-48.
204. Id. § 3.2, at 140. Because the plaintiff's own particular losses are usually irrelevant in
assessing general damages, there is nothing radical about a general damages or market value approach to fee awards.
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market value for those services. 20 5 Although such an approach may
arouse concern, 20 6 it has roots in the general law of damages, 2 7 and the

advantage of using an objective measure of fee liability may heavily outweigh the disadvantages. 208

Although market value furnishes a more objective test than the subjective Johnson factors, unresolved issues remain. For example, suppose
a lawyer practices in one geographical area but tries a case in another.
Does he recover a fee commensurate with that which his services would
command in the area where he practices, or the area where the case is

tried? More importantly, does a court in determining the market for
legal services look to what other lawyers with similar qualifications
charge for similar work, or to the fee claimant's own historical fee
charges for similar work? More importantly still, can a lawyer's services
in litigation be said to have any market at all? These are serious issues.
But even if there exists no model market for legal services, an hourly rate
approach based on hourly rates charged by similar practitioners furnishes a more objective, less whimsical guide than does the Johnson fac-

tors approach.
C. Enhancements and MultipliersApplied When Calculatingthe Fee.

1. The Back Door to the Johnson Factors. Although the court in
Lindy I looked toward market value, it did not rule out consideration of
nonmarket, subjective factors. In Lindy , the court specified two factors
that could justify increasing or decreasing the lodestar figure: the quality
of the services provided and the risk the lawyer took that there would be
no payment at all. 20 9 Later, in Lindy II, the same court recognized that,
205. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 899-900 (1984).
206. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)
("[T]he market value concept is unworkable where there is no true market .... ").
207. There are, however, some distinctions between this situation and the normal common law
damages action. For one thing, the hourly rate for legal services includes an amount to cover overhead. Assuming that both are allowed to use the same hourly rate in calculating fee awards, a
nonprofit law firm with low overhead will actually make more "profit" than an entrepreneurial firm.
When the fee is to be fixed for legal services rendered to an established client, this fact may be taken
into account. Cf Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 315 (2d Cir. 1985) (lawyer's
lower overhead considered as one ground for reducing hourly rate).
208. The advantages of the market approach become more apparent when one considers the
valuation problems that arise in other areas. For example, in the case of pain and suffering, no
market is available, and awards are consequently disparate and dependent on highly subjective factors unrelated to the merits of the case. Wildly disparate fee awards are themselves bad. Using a
market approach cannot simplify fee calculations, but it can enable courts to deal with them in a
judicial fashion.
209. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
168 (3d Cir. 1973). The court recognized the possibility that other factors might also appropriately
be considered, but it mentioned only these two. Id.
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at least to a large extent, the "quality" of legal services was already accounted for in selecting a reasonable hourly rate, so that enhancement of
2 10
a fee for exceptional legal services might actually overcompensate.
Lindy I in effect said that reasonable hours times a reasonable hourly
rate produces a reasonable fee, but that a reasonable fee must then be
doubled in order to be reasonable. Though Lindy II recognized this error, it nonetheless left room for the practice, and courts have continued
to augment fees found to be reasonable by adding enhancements or "multipliers"-a practice that reflects both the urge to use percentages and
the habits of thought embodied in the Johnson list of factors.
2. The Curious Implications of Hensley. The Supreme Court accepted the lodestar formula in Hensley v. Eckerhart.2 11 But it also countenanced the open back door for importing the Johnson factors. The
Court said that a district court may properly consider the Johnson factors, but noted that many of these factors are ordinarily subsumed in the
lodestar figure. 2 12 In fact, the Court's analysis in Hensley depended
heavily on one of the Johnson factors, namely the "results obtained" factor. In Hensley, the Court held that when the plaintiff is less than completely successful, the trier must reduce the fee award if the lack of
success is significant.2 13 Since a low level of success can mandate a reduction in the fee, the implication would seem to be that a high level of
success could mandate an enhancement of the fee, and indeed, the Court
said that exceptional success might justify an enhanced fee award. 2 14 Behind Hensley, then, might lie the implicit view that the time invested and
hourly rate figures do not already cover the issue of quality of work. The
effect of this view would be to let the Johnson camel into the Lindy tent.
However, when the precise issue of enhancement actually arose, the
Supreme Court held quite differently. In Blum v. Stenson 2 15 the Court
held that enhancements of a fee based on the quality of legal work would
not be acceptable, at least in ordinary cases, for the very reason that quality of work was subsumed in the hourly rate.
The effect of Blum was a firm position against the Johnson factors
method of fee calculation. Given a fee computation based on hourly fee
charges, most of those factors would already be reflected in the determination of reasonable hours or in the determination of the reasonable rate.
210.
117 (3d
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102,
Cir. 1976).
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
Id. at 434 n.9.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.
465 U.S. 886 (1984).

470
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For example, novelty and complexity of the case "were fully reflected in
the number of billable hours recorded by counsel and thus do not warrant an upward adjustment in the fee."' 2 16 Special skill of counsel
"should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates"2 1 7 and the
same would apply to the quality of representation.2 1 8 Public benefit obtained by the plaintiff's success, the Court thought, had no obvious effect
on the fee calculation at all.2 19 And even "results obtained," which the
Court in Hensley had found so significant in fixing the fee, was thought
to be "subsumed within other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee"
so that "it normally should not provide an independent basis for increasing the fee award. 2 20 The Court reiterated a similar analysis in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air.221
It is difficult to reconcile the holding in Blum with the holding in
Hensley. Under Blum, the lawyer's extraordinary success in the case
does not warrant an increase in the fee award, while under Hensley, the
lawyer's failure to achieve total success may require a reduction in the fee
award. Blum assumes the market rate encompasses the value of high
success. Hensley assumes the market rate does not encompass the value
of limited success.
How is this apparent conflict in premises to be resolved? The Hensley decision might be interpreted to mean simply that a reduction is required if the practice of lawyers generally-the market-would be to
make a reduction. If this is all Hensley means, it can easily coexist with
Blum. Yet such an interpretation seems strained.
Trial judges setting fees find the subjective factors congenial; those
factors do not require taking extensive evidence, and appellate courts
have little objective basis for review. The seeming conflict between Hensley and Blum encourages a reading of Blum that permits continued use
of subjective factors. The result may be a conflict in principles at the
highest level and a risk of over- or under-compensation.
D. The Risk Factor.
1. Contingency Enhancement Rationale and Effect. Courts have
often used a contingency or risk multiplier on the ground that the reasonable hourly fee was reasonable only if payment was assured. 222 Lawyers
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id at 898.
Id.

Id. at 899.
Id. at 900.
Id.
106 S.Ct. 3088 (1986).
See, eg., Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 1983).
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representing civil rights plaintiffis and class action plaintiffs may have no
source of revenue other than fee awards, so if they lose, they may receive
nothing. To bring the fee award up to a level they considered fully compensatory, some courts have accordingly multiplied the lodestar fee by a
figure that was intended to reflect the risk factor.223 The resulting fee
awards ranged from as little as 110%224 to as much as 400%225 of the fee
based on the reasonable hourly rate. Most multipliers in civil rights cases
fell somewhere in the range between 1.0 and 2.0.226 Whatever the range,
the difference between one multiplier and another might run to millions
227
of dollars in fees.

2. Criticism of the Contingency Multiplier. The contingency multiplier has been subject to much criticism. 22 8 Some of this criticism focuses on the difficulty of establishing a suitable multiplier. The
multipliers used are almost entirely subjective; there is no way to test
whether a multiplier is fair without some information about market values. Yet there probably is no market to which one could turn since most
clients do not pay their lawyers on a contingent hourly rate. 229 Furthermore, a rational effort to award multipliers for risk would require a caseby-case assessment of the risk of winning or losing. 230 Case-by-case assessment would become even more complicated in substantial cases
23 1
where the contingency or risk may change as the litigation progresses.
In cases of this kind, the imponderable risk would have to be pondered
and recalculated repeatedly. This would require substantial litigation,
223. Prior to Blum, courts sometimes used multipliers in conjunction with the Johnson factors.
See, e.g., Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1356-57 (1lth Cir. 1983).
224. See, e.g., Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1979).
225. See, e.g., Arenson v. Board of Trade, 372 F. Supp. 1349, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
226. See Wildman v. Lerer Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 613 (Ist Cir. 1985) (citing survey indicating that multipliers as high as 2.0 are rare in civil rights cases).
227. In In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F. Supp.
680, 693-703 (D. Minn. 1975), one lawyer was given a multiplier of 3.0. After deducting $1.5 million from the award because of other fees the lawyer could collect, the court awarded him over $3
million. Id. at 694.
228. See, eg., Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473,
482-97 (1981).
229. Contingent fee contracts usually provide for a percentage of the dollar recovery in the case,
not for hourly fees. Hourly fee billing, on the other hand, is usually not contingent. Thus, there is
no "market" in any practical sense.
230. It is not clear, however, what class of contingency would be estimated. The court might
consider the risk of loss in (a) all cases, (b) civil rights cases only, (c) cases characterized in some
narrower fashion, e.g., "police brutality cases," or (d) the particular case before the court. Still
other methods for evaluating the risk might be used. The court might look to the lawyer's own
historic success rate. That rate would of course reflect the lawyer's preference in cases, ability to
obtain good cases, and skill in trying or settling them.
231. See M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 10, 16.041]; Leubsdorf, supra note 228, at 494.
This depends on the standard used in measuring the risk, however. See supra note 230.
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and more time might consequently be spent litigating the fee issues than

232
the merits.
A further problem is that the use of contingency multipliers is likely
to encourage unmeritorious litigation. 233 As Professor Leubsdorf
pointed out, the lawyer is given the largest fee for bringing the most unpromising case and the smallest fee for bringing the best case. 23 4 The
lawyer thus has an incentive to argue that the case is weak. Because fees
are often claimed during trial or before appeal, this kind of argument
may later cut against the client's interest if the case is retried on the
23 5
merits. The result is a conflict of interest.

3. Pre-Blum Acceptance of Contingency Multipliersand Post-Blum
Divisions. Before the Supreme Court decided Blum, lower courts solidly favored contingency or risk multipliers. 23 6 Several courts have continued to use the contingency multiplier in spite of what may be the
implications of Blum and Hensley. 237 Two courts, however, have spoken
out against the practice. The United States Courts of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit 238 and the Seventh Circuit 239 accepted the
validity of Professor Leubsdorf's observation that the use of contingency
2 40
multipliers encouraged lawyers to pursue unmeritorious litigation.
232. See Leubsdorf, supra note 228, at 485-86.
233. See McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984); Leubsdorf, supra
note 228, at 491.
234. See Leubsdorf, supra note 228, at 488-89.
235. Id. at 482-84.
236. See, eg., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638-39 (6th Cir. 1979), cerl. denied,
447 U.S. 911 (1980); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1976). But cf Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1981)
(risk of nonpayment insufficient by itself to justify multiplier).
237. See, eg., Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 611-13 (1st Cir. 1985); Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council For Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.
1985).
Five months after Blum was decided, an Eleventh Circuit panel approved a contingency enhancement. See Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir. 1984).
There was no citation to Blum. Almost a year after Blum was decided, another Eleventh Circuit
panel approved contingency enhancements in dictum, citing Blum, but not discussing any of its
possible implications. See Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 591-93 (11 th Cir. 1984) (contingent fee contract with the client would be grounds for an increase in attorney fees). The Fourth
Circuit, apparently reading Blum to cover contingency as well as quality multipliers, approved a
contingency enhancement of a fee award on the ground that the attorneys' investment of over 6,000
hours of time over a ten-month period constituted an exceptional circumstance that justified the
enhancement in light of the risk involved. See Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 770 F.2d 1244, 1246 (4th
Cir. 1985).
238. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 3488 (1985); see also Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
239. McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.).
240. Leubsdorf, supra note 228, at 482-97; see supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
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These courts also noted that the use of contingency multipliers indirectly
compensated lawyers for the cases they lost by augmenting their winnings when they won. 2 41 Such a result, these courts suggested, violates
the Hensley rule that no compensation be given for losses on any matter
242
distinct from the claim that was won.
4. The Interaction Between a Client's Fee Payment and Contingency. The role that the client's fee contract plays in fee award determi-

nation is too complicated for a complete investigation here.243 One
aspect, however, is critical to the contingency multiplier. If the client has
paid the agreed-upon fee in advance, there is obviously no risk that the
lawyer will go unpaid. One would expect that no fee enhancement for
contingency would be possible. 244 If the client has not actually paid the
lawyer but has agreed to do so, there remains a risk that the client will
not actually pay, although there is no contingency as to the liability of

the client. One court has reasoned that no multiplier should be used in
this case. 245 Use of a contingency multiplier would seem justified, if at
all, only when the client has no contractual obligation to pay a fee, or
when the obligation to pay is contingent on success. The client who has
paid all or part of the fee in advance has eliminated the contingency and
should recover the prepaid amount with interest from whatever amount
the lawyer is awarded.
241. As the court stated in McKinnon:
The fundamental problem of a risk bonus is that it compensates attorneys, indirectly but
effectively, for bringing unsuccessful civil rights suits, even though the attorney's fee statute
is expressly limited to cases where the party seeking the fee prevails.... Suppose a plaintiff
asks for and receives a multiplier of 2 because he had a 50 percent chance of losing the
case. This means that if the plaintiff's lawyer tries 10 such cases and wins 5... he will be
paid as if he had won them all; that is, he will be paid twice his normal charge for each of
the 5 cases he won, to compensate him for getting nothing in the 5 cases he lost.
McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984). The court in Laffey made the
same observation and cited Hensley in support of its position. The court stated that the Hensley rule
limiting compensation to portions of the lawsuit on which the plaintiff prevailed "also forbids multiplying attorney fees so as effectively to compensate counsel for other, losing claims which may be
brought." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 3488 (1985).
242. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983).
243. For a discussion of judicial efforts to achieve an accommodation when the American Rule
and a party's private contractual fee arrangement provide competing bases for fees, see M. DERFNER
& A. WOLF, supra note 10, %6.03(2).
244. See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Saly, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 660 (7th Cir. 1985); Murray
v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1431-32 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610
F.2d 46, 47 (Ist Cir. 1979). The client's fee liability, however, is not the limit of fee recovery. See
Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 733 F.2d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1984).
245. See Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 592-93 (11th Cir. 1984).
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5. Assessing the Conflict in Contingency Enhancements. In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air, 24 6 the Court
did not resolve the question whether it is appropriate to use a contingency or risk multiplier to raise the base fee; instead, it ordered reargument of that issue. The implications of Blum may suggest an appropriate
answer. Blum was predicated on a principle of compensation 247 measured by the market value of services rendered. 248 The Court explicitly
held that the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours
reasonably invested is prima facie the extent of liability. The plaintiff has
249
the burden of proving grounds for an adjustment based on quality.
The proof must show that the hourly rate awarded does not adequately
250
compensate the lawyer for the quality of services rendered.
Unless there is some reason to believe that Blum represents an isolated rule rather than a general principle, it seems that courts should
25
apply the same approach to fee enhancements based on the risk factor. '
Thus the plaintiff making such a claim should be required to show that
the fee based on hourly rates does not reflect the true market value of the
services. Presumably this would also necessitate a showing that the re246. 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3100 (1986). The Court did not have occasion to consider the contingency
multiplier in Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n.17 (1984), but Justice Brennan, concurring in Blum, took the
position that contingency adjustments are appropriate in the civil rights context. Id. at 903 (Brennan, J., concurring).
247. Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion in Blum, has emphasized in a variety of
cases that compensation should be a limit of liability. See, eg., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254
(1978).
248. The Court in Blum expressly adhered to the prevailing-market-rates test of the fee in two
distinct contexts. First, the Court held that fee awards to legal services attorneys must be calculated
according to the prevailing market rate, not according to a cost-related standard. 465 U.S. at 89596. Second, the Court held that prevailing market rates presumably reflect the quality of counsel's
work, and enhancement is ordinarily inappropriate. Id. at 899-900.
249. Id. at 897.
250. Id. at 898-900. See also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
106 S. Ct. 3088, 3099-100 (1986) (enhancement of fee award for quality of work inappropriate where
there was no showing that work was of superior quality).
251. In Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985), the court discussed the
contingency issue at length, see id. at 611-14, but never cited Professor Leubsdorf's analysis. The
court also ignored the arguments made in McKinnon and Laffey. See supra notes 238, 241. The
court suggested that any problems associated with increasing the award as the case becomes less
meritorious are purely practical and not grounded in principle. Wildman, 771 F.2d at 611-13. See
also Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 620 (8th Cir. 1985) (multiplier approved on unclear
grounds).
The Third Circuit's task force, though critical ofthe discrimination that occurred because of the
quality multiplier, dispatched all problems with the contingency multiplier in these words:
In contrast to its views on the quality factor, the Task Force feels that the contingency
factor, which it defines simply as 'the risk of winning or losing,' should be considered in all
cases. Plaintiffs' attorneys always face the prospect of receiving no compensation in statutory fee cases. Accordingly, even modest risks in cases in which liability is reasonably
certain to be established should be recognized in the fee-setting process.
108 F.R.D. at 265 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
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quested enhancement would be compensatory as measured in the
market.
But if Blum rules out enhancements based on quality or novelty, it
does so because the hourly fee charge is already calculated to cover such
elements. This is not necessarily so in the case of the contingency enhancement. On the contrary, it seems unlikely that most lawyers in private practice set hourly rates adjusted to the contingency of nonpayment;
most lawyers charging hourly fees do not also charge on a contingency of
success. Blum's market principles do not, then, necessarily exclude a
contingency enhancement. If the hourly fee charge claimed by the plaintiff is already adjusted to account for the risk of losing, a contingency
enhancement would be inappropriate under Blum. If it is not so adjusted, a contingency enhancement would be logically possible. But
Blum imposes another rule that may preclude the enhancement as a
practical matter: Blum requires the plaintiff to show any grounds for an
adjustment to the lodestar. Implicitly at least, this rule would seem to
require proof in objective, market terms. Most plaintiffs probably cannot
meet this requirement. If these implications are followed, as a practical
2 52
matter the contingency multiplier will be eliminated in most cases.
E. Compensationfor Delayed Payment.
1. Delay in Payment: Interest. In light of the fact that the plaintiff-or counsel-is not paid until the conclusion of litigation, one can
argue that courts should add a charge to compensate for the delay. Because lawyers do not collect in advance fees based on hourly charges,
calculation of interest would require a determination of appropriate bill253
ing periods and a separate calculation of interest for each period.
Given the market-oriented approach advanced in Blum, the court presumably would be required to determine when each portion of the fee
252. Applying a standard multiplier in all cases, as Professor Leubsdorf suggests, see Leubsdorf,
supra note 228, at 511-12, might circumvent some of the problems outlined above. Yet it would not
solve the problem altogether. Leubsdorf proposes a standard multiplier of 2.0. Under such a regime, both very promising and very risky cases would be encouraged. To the extent that the standard multiplier would encourage very marginal cases, it is highly undesirable. Leubsdorf believes
that a multiplier of 2.0 would be desirable because, in theory, it would encourage only those cases
with a fifty-fifty chance of success. Given the glut of lawyers, I think it is unlikely that only such
good cases would be brought. Furthermore, the lawyers who can command the best cases are subject to virtually no contingencies because they select only winners and high-value cases. They would
get the multiplier of 2.0 in any event under Leubsdorf's proposal. The riskier cases will sift to the
bottom level of legal services and will keep marginal lawyers in business.
253. See Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 923 (3d Cir.

1985).
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would have been billed to a fee-paying client in a similar private case, 254
and how much of a delay in payment lawyers would ordinarily tolerate

255
before charging interest to a fee-paying client.

Courts have allowed interest actually earned on portions of a common fund already allocated to attorney fees. 256 In addition, one court

since Blum has approved the principle of awarding some other kind of
adjustment for delay in payment. 257 Interest charges, 2 58 however, are not

the preferred means of making the adjustment, partly because of the difficulties in calculation. 259 Rather than try to calculate delay costs, some
courts have used a subjectively selected multiplier to enhance the fee
260
award.

Some courts have attempted to reflect delay costs in a fee award by
using current billing rates-as opposed to the rates that prevailed when
the services were actually rendered-to calculate the award. 261 The idea
is that the increase in billing rates will reflect inflation, which is a substantial component of interest rates. Applying current billing rates to
services rendered many months or years ago would to a large extent
262
serve as a substitute for applying the old rate and adding delay costs.
Using current billing rates is more convenient than calculating delay
254. Cf.Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[A]warding compensation at
current rates. . . will obviate the necessity of guessing when periodic billings would have been made
255. See id. (noting that private attorneys do not recover full interest for late payments).
256. See, eg., Boston & Maine Corp. v. Moore, 776 F.2d 2, 13 (1st Cir. 1985).
257. Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir. 1984) (noncommittal direction to the trial court to "take into account the long delay in any payment to the plaintiff or
his counsel").
258. The court may be willing to charge interest in lieu of contempt sanctions, however. See
Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1396 (8th Cir. 1983) (interim award not
paid as ordered; court of appeals upheld trial court's subsequent in terrorem order of interest at 14%
and all interest charges incurred by plaintiffs in borrowing).
259. See Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 129 (Ist Cir. 1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546,
555 (10th Cir. 1983). Yet in Shaw v. Library of Congress, 747 F.2d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986), the court upheld a 30% enhancement even though the enhancement was a delay-compensation factor based on the average yield the lawyer would have received had he invested the fee when services were rendered.
260. See, eg., Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 922-23 (3d
Cir. 1985) (1.25 multiplier upheld); cf Grendel's Den, Inc. v.Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 955 (1st Cir.
1984) (costs of delayed payment cited as consideration in approving fee).
261. See Murray v. Weinberger, 741 F.2d 1423, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713
F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983); cf Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 593 (1 1th Cir. 1984)
(noting that trial court may have used current rates to calculate basic fee award and affirming a
denial of interest).
262. The relationship between interest and inflation is increasingly a part of the proof in claims
for future damages. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 547-49 (1983). As a
matter of judicial administration and convenience, a "total offset" of interest and inflation in fee
award cases would be the easiest solution.
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costs, because it makes it unnecessary to determine when billing would
263
have taken place in a hypothetical similar case.
2. Delay in Payment: Inflation. One component of interest is a
charge for expected inflation. An investor who expects to be repaid with
highly inflated dollars will demand more interest than one who expects to
be repaid with only moderately inflated dollars. The interest rate also
reflects the risk of nonpayment and the cost of delayed access to the
money. At least one court has held that even though a court may not
add interest to the fee award, it can adjust the fee award to reflect the fact
2
that the lawyer is recovering dollars that are worth less. 6
3. Delay Adjustments and Contingency Multipliers. Obvious parallels exist between the risk of nonpayment and delay costs. Delayed
payment is in a sense the short-term version of nonpayment. But courts
can make adjustments for delay costs without resorting to the kind of
subjective process involved in determining a contingency multiplier;
there is no need to assess the risk involved in the case itself. Thus an
adjustment to reflect delay costs, if properly calculated, could be both
practical and consistent with the compensatory, market-oriented approach advanced by the Supreme Court in Blum.
But because delay and risk of nonpayment are closely related, it
might be inappropriate to both use a contingency multiplier and make a
delay adjustment, even if it would otherwise be appropriate to use a multiplier. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took
this view in a class action case in which the fee award was based on
common fund principles. 265 The court reasoned that the risk of not being paid at all included the risk of not being paid before judgment, and
hence overlapped substantially with the cost of delay. Adjustment for
the larger risk by way of a contingency multiplier, then, was also adjustment for the smaller risk of delay. 266 Once the court has fixed the fee, or
once the fund is in court, some adjustment, quite possibly interest on the
263. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983). But an award calculated on this
basis may be inaccurate because it would include increased charges due solely to the lawyer's increased skill, experience, or productivity. See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d
646, 654 (7th Cir. 1985) (using weighted average of historical hourly billing rates).
264. See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1985).
265. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 588 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting in dictum
that during initial litigation aimed at creation of common fund, delay and risk of lack of success are

interrelated).
266. Id. Cf Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 660 (7th Cir. 1985)
(contingency enhancement would operate to compensate lawyer for both risk of nonpayment and
time value of money).
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amount of the fee, is of course appropriate. 267
F.

Other Elements of the Fee Claim.

1. Feesfor Work on the Fee Claim Itself
a. Recovery in Statutory Cases. In the common fund and substantial benefit cases, courts have denied fee awards for work on the fee

claim itself on the ground that such work does not generate the benefit
that lies at the heart of the common fund claim. 268 Similarly, courts have
denied awards for work on fee claims in cases where the right to a fee
award is based on contract or indemnity. 269 But it is well settled that a
lawyer's work on the fee claim itself is compensable in civil rights2 70 and
other statutory cases.2 71
272
As with all other fee claims, the time and rate must be reasonable.
Even so, litigation over the award for work on the fee claim can be extensive, and the fee petition and record of time expended is sometimes extremely complex. 273 Furthermore, the parties may engage in substantial
adversary work-such as discovery-in connection with the fee claim
litigation.2 74 When discovery is disallowed, parties may engage in litiga267. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 588 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that court
below committed legal error in disregarding delay factor in calculating contingent multiplier; after
common fund has been established, during period while court determines litigant's share of fund,
there is no risk of lack of success, and delay factor is precisely measurable).
268. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1102 (2d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros.
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 111 (3d Cir. 1976).
Insofar as prevailing lawyers are usually paid for the case as a whole, this view depends on whether
the fee claim is in some significant way separable from the remainder of the case. It might be
deemed separable because it comes after the merits determination. This goes too far, however; posttrial monitoring of the decree, for example, is compensable. See infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text. If it is deemed separable because it deals with fees, not with the merits, the argument
assumes that which is in question.
269. See, eg., Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 319 (2d Cir. 1985).
270. See, eg., Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1985); Devine v. Sutermeister, 733
F.2d 892, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 652 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1981),
vacated and remanded, 461 U.S. 951 (1983) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Hensley).
271. See, eg., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 656 (7th Cir. 1985)
(antitrust); In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy).
272. See Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1985).
273. See, eg., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting that an item-by-item analysis would take too much time and "be neither practical nor
desirable").
274. See Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 563 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Stastny v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 77 F.R.D. 662, 663 (W.D.N.C. 1978). This tertiary litigation can be
extensive and can even move into other stages. For example, if some of the plaintiff's claimed hours
are denied, the defendant may assert that the fee claim itself was in bad faith. In such case, the
defendant would have a fee claim to litigate. See Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455,
461-62 (8th Cir. 1983).
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tion over whether it should have been permitted. 275 All this adds new
hours to the work and engenders new fee claims. Consequently, the fee
2 76
award for work on the fee claim may be substantial.
b. Adjustments for Risk on the Petition. Courts may adjust this
portion of the fee, as they may any other, for duplication or excessive
hours. 277 Should courts also adjust for contingency or partial success?
Once the plaintiff has won the case, the amount of the fee is contingent
but the right to the fee is not. Thus no contingency multiplier should be
applied to the hours devoted to the fee claim itself, because there is no
contingency as to recovery for those hours. At least one court has suggested a contrary view, apparently without considering this point.278
c. Adjustments for Partial Success on the Fee Petition. The
Supreme Court held in Hensley that a court should reduce the fee award

2 79
by some amount if the plaintiff achieves a significantly limited success.

This rule presumably applies with equal force to fees for work on the fee
claim when the fee claim itself is only partly successful. At least one case
has approved a Hensley reduction based on lack of total success on the
fee claim. 280
2. Feesfor Posttrial Work andAppellate Work. Courts have also
allowed fees for posttrial monitoring of a party's compliance with the
court's decree. 281 Such posttrial work is particularly important in cases
involving institutional restructuring where those who benefit from the
restructuring may be unable to observe and report violations of the decree on their own. 28 2 Posttrial administrative work aimed at protecting
275. See, eg., Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 80 F.R.D. 293, 294 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (denying
motion to compel discovery).
276. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (claim of
$358,000 in fees for handling the fee claim), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 3488 (1985); cf Peter Fabrics,
Inc. v. S.S. Hermes, 765 F.2d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 1985) (three day trial on fee issue in case that
involved only $30,000 on the merits).
277. Cf. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1985) (15% reduction for vague fee petition).
278. See Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Bd., 719 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1983) (enhancement added to fees earned for work done on appeal involving fee issue); see also Cruz v. Hauck, 762
F.2d 1230, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985) (approving use of Johnson factors, one of which is risk of nonsuccess, in assessing fees earned in presenting fee claim).
279. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-37 (1983).
280. See Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 924-25 (3d Cir.
1985).
281. See, eg., Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738-39 (1st Cir. 1984).
282. See id. (approving award for monitoring decree giving relief to mentally retarded persons);
Willie M. v. Hunt, 732 F.2d 383, 387 (4th Cir. 1984) (approving allowance of award for monitoring
consent judgment requiring state to provide appropriate treatment and education to emotionally
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rights adjudicated in the action on the merits may also be fully
283
compensable.
Finally, the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees for work done on
appeal. The appellate court may either set this fee itself 28 4 or instruct the

trial court to set

it.285

One problem with the latter approach is that it

may result in yet another appeal. 28 6 Courts have applied both kinds of
adjustments-the contingency multiplier and the Hensley reduction-in
28 7
calculating fee awards for appellate work.

G.

Overhead and Special Cost Items.
Courts have traditionally awarded "costs" only when specifically

authorized by statute. 28 8 The civil rights fee award statutes and some
others list attorney fees as "costs. '2 89 A few courts once read this combination of statutes to mean that the prevailing plaintiff could recover costs
specified in the cost statutes and a reasonable attorney fee, but nothing
disturbed children); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir. 1979) (approving
award for monitoring school desegregation decree), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). There are,
however, important limitations on the amount that may be awarded in such cases. See Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1985) (no fee for monitoring consent decree providing procedural safeguards for admission of mentally retarded or mentally
ill juveniles to mental health facilities after "last benefit" earned).
283. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106 S. Ct. 3088,
3094-96 (1986).
284. See, eg., Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 738 F.2d 348, 348-49 (8th Cir. 1984) (per

curiam).
285. See, eg., In re Kansas Congressional Dists. Reapportionment Cases, 745 F.2d 610, 614
(10th Cir. 1984); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 218 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
1395 (1985)
286. See Shimman v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 744 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1191 (1985). For a discussion of other difficulties involved in selecting an
appropriate procedure for fee awards and appeals, see Green, From Here to Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairnessin the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 207
(1984).
287. See Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 738 F.2d 348, 350-51 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(Hensley reduction of fee on appeal, coupled with offsetting enhancement for contingency); Yates v.
Mobile County Personnel Bd., 719 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1983) (contingency a factor in decision to enhance fee for appellate work).
288. Six categories of costs are specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982). These include fees for the
clerk and marshall, fees for the court reporter, fees and disbursements for witnesses, and docket fees.
Some of the costs are specified in dollar amounts in other sections. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1821
(1982) provides dollar amounts for witness fees ($30 per day), with allowances for travel and a
subsistence allowance.
289. Dissenting in Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3036-39 (1985), Justice Brennan listed
sixty-four statutes that referred to attorney fee awards as part of "costs," forty-nine that allowed
attorney fees but did not specify them as "costs," and seven that referred to "costs and expenses,
including attorney's fees."

Vol. 1986:435]

AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES

for any related litigation expense items. 2 90 This view has gained no widespread acceptance. Instead, courts have looked to the policies underlying
the fee award statutes 29 1 and have generally awarded all reasonable liti292
gation costs.

Thus, the plaintiff can recover many items of special expense in addition to the attorney fee itself. These may include the costs of paralegals
and law clerks, 293 travel expenses and long distance phone calls, 294 secretarial overtime,295 and any other expense that lawyers normally bill separately. 29 6 There is no rule about particular items; instead, the rule is to
follow the market. If private attorneys do not bill a given item separately
because it is part of overhead, then that item is not recoverable as a cost
in a fee award case. This is another way of saying that the reasonable297
ness of the hourly fee rate depends on what overhead it must absorb.
H. Actual Calculation Under the Market Method.
In accordance with the market orientation adopted in Hensley and
Blum, courts assessing fee awards have mainly considered the number of
hours reasonably invested in the case and the appropriate billing rate for
those hours. These two elements are necessarily considered together.
Hours billed at partner rates may be reasonable if not numerous; hours
billed at paralegal rates might be quite numerous and still be considered
290. See Roe v. City of Chicago, 586 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1984), rev'd on othergrounds,
Levka v. City of Chicago, 748 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1984); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D.
Colo. 1978). In neither case did the court address the question whether firms normally bill these
expense items separately or absorb them as overhead costs.
291. See Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The Act would... fall short
of its goal if it excluded those expenses."); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636, 637 (lst Cir. 1983)
(policy considerations justify "reimbursement of reasonable and necessary attorneys' expenses");
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The issue of which expenses are
properly chargeable to the defendants under section 1988 is ... governed by the purposes of the
governing statute ....
).
292. See Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[C]ost includes the out-ofpocket expenses for which lawyers normally bill their clients separately .... "); Dowdell v. City of
Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[W]ith the exception of routine office overhead
normally absorbed by the practicing attorney, all reasonable expenses incurred in case preparation,
during the course of litigation, or as an aspect of settlement of the case may be taxed as costs under
section 1988.").
293. See Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 846 (7th Cir. 1984); Lamphere
v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1979).
294. See Boston & Maine Corp. v. Moore, 776 F.2d 2, 11 (1st Cir. 1985).
295. See Cherry v. Rockdale County, 601 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (costs of secretarial services recoverable if not absorbed as overhead covered by hourly rates).
296. See Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 1984).
297. Fact should play a greater role than precedent in determining the recoverability of expense
items. Cf Cherry v. Rockdale County, 601 F. Supp. 78, 81 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("[C]ounsel for the
plaintiffs are obliged to demonstrate whether the attorneys whose fees are being relied upon separately bill their clients for the kinds of things for which recovery is sought .... ").
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reasonable because the rate is relatively low and a less effective use of
time can be expected. 298 If paralegals or associates could have done the
299
work, the court may want to limit the rates for work partners bill.
Such a limitation would be appropriate if the hourly rate is fixed by considering the rates of other lawyers who use the more efficient staffing
patterns. But if the hourly rate has already been set at a level appropriate
30 0
to the inefficient staffing, no further reduction would be required.
Although courts consider time and rate in fixing a market-based fee,
there is no rule requiring that the fee award be somehow proportionate to
the recovery on the merits. 301 Hensley requires no such rule; it only requires that the court adjust the fee to reflect partial failures on issues
independent of those on which the plaintiff won. Blum's insistence on a
market standard seems to imply that proportionality would be of interest
only as evidence of whether the hourly rates were too high or whether
too much time was invested in the case.
Because no rule of proportionality is imposed, parties pursue some
cases with more gusto than they would otherwise. In City of Riverside v.
Rivera, 30 2 the plaintiffs recovered $33,000 in damages and a $245,000
attorney fee award. In Cunningham v. McKeesport,30 3 the plaintiff
purchased a house for $2700 and the city negligently destroyed it. The
plaintiff's attorney claimed almost 250 hours in pretrial discovery in the
suit against the city and ultimately recovered $17,000 for the plaintiffas well as a fee of almost $36,000. 304 One of the judges, dissenting from
the denial of a motion for a rehearing, pointed out that 250 hours of
discovery would be the equivalent of six full weeks of legal services and
that the property had been found at trial to be worth no more than
$17,000.305
298. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898 (1984) ("[T]he special skill and experience of counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates."); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
746 F.2d 4, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Hourly rates ...are to some degree a function of productivity."),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3488 (1985); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 589 (3d Cir.
1984) ("quality multiplier" permitted if attorney has worked "with unusual efficiency, and with little
expenditure of ... time").
299. See Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 920 (1st Cir. 1980).
300. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 3488 (1985).
301. See, eg., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S.Ct. 2686 (1986) ($33,000 recovery, $245,000 fee
award); Easley v. Empire, Inc., 757 F.2d 923, 932 (8th Cir. 1985) ($1,800 recovery, $30,000 fee
award).
302. 106 S.Ct. 2686 (1986). See infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
303. 753 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 106 S.Ct. 3324 (1986) (remanded for
further consideration in light of Rivera).
304. Id. at 265-69.
305. Id. at 270 (Adams, J., dissenting).

Vol. 1986:435]

AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES

Disproportionate fee awards may often seem unpalatable, but the
alternatives so far identified may be even more so. In cases involving
only injunctive relief, for example, a proportion rule would be very difficult if not impossible to apply. More fundamentally, the civil rights fee
award statutes are based on the premise that market incentives are inadequate to permit prosecution of civil rights cases-this is the very reason
why the fee award is authorized. Thus, a client's unwillingness to pay a
fee higher than the potential benefit should be irrelevant, at least in civil
rights cases. More fundamentally, the civil rights fee award statutes are
based on the premise that legal fees at market rates are inadequate to
foster an appropriate level of civil rights suits. One reason for the inadequacy is that the benefit a single civil rights plaintiff can recover is often
so limited that the plaintiff will be compelled to forgo the suit. But forgoing the suit means forgoing the external benefits that it will bring-the
public benefits resulting from civil rights enforcement. It is to avoid loss
of these public benefits, which are in no way measured by the benefit to
the individual plaintiff, that the fee-shifting statutes were enacted. For
these reasons, a private client's unwillingness to pay a fee higher than his
own personal benefit furnishes no good guide to the appropriate fee.
However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Riverside v.
Rivera 306 raises some practical concerns about the external benefits analysis. In a much-divided Court, four Justices, voting to uphold a fee
award nearly eight times as large as the relief on the merits, held that in
civil rights fee litigation, the fee award need not be limited to the amount
of the damages recovery, although the success of the plaintiff would remain a factor under Hensley. 307 Four other Justices, voting to reverse
the award, took the position that it was unreasonable and that the fee
awards should not exceed the amount a fee-paying client would invest in
attorney fees, except where the interest vindicated was nonpecuniary or
when external benefits were significant and identifiable. 30° Justice Powell
concurred with the first four to uphold the award. 30 9 Like the Justices in
dissent, Powell was unwilling to assume externalized benefits, but in his
view the district court's finding that the litigation actually served the
public interest as well as the interests of the individual plaintiffs sup310
ported the disproportionate award.
On its facts, Rivera permitted a fee award in excess of the recovery
on the merits. But it does not augur well for civil rights lawyers. The
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986).
Id. at 2694.
Id. at 2704-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2700 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 2700 (Powell, J., concurring).
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fee-shifting statutes appear to rest on the belief that all cases within their
ambit entail public benefits; but five of the Justices in Rivera expressed a

view that except with respect to wholly nonpecuniary claims, a disproportionate fee could be justified only if external benefits could in some
way be discerned. It is too soon to say whether this will induce a new

level of fee litigation in which fee claimants attempt to prove the level of
external benefits.
1. The Time Element in Calculating Fees Under the Market

Method. Assuming the billing rates claimed are reasonable, the question then arises whether the amount of time expended was reasonable.

The fee claimant has the burden of proving the number of hours expended. 3 11 A court may reduce the fee if this proof is unclear, 3 12 but

courts frequently give the claimant more than one opportunity to carry
its burden. 3 13 Courts initially encouraged fee claimants to keep contemporaneous time records and to present those records to the court. 314 This

did not prove successful, however, and several courts have consequently
announced an intention to make the submission of contemporaneous
time records a prerequisite to fee recovery. 31 5 In addition, reviewing
courts have insisted that trial judges furnish a clear statement explaining
31 6
how the fee award was calculated.
Three distinct problems prevent reliable determination of the

number of hours for which compensation is appropriate. First, it is impossible to tell how much time the lawyer actually spent working on the
case. Second, it is difficult to judge whether that amount of time was

reasonable. Third, it is difficult to hypothesize what fee the market
would bear. Because determining the number of hours expended is likely
311. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d
562, 585 (3d Cir. 1984).
312. See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 651, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1985);
Lynch v. City of Milwaukee, 747 F.2d 423, 427-28 (7th Cir. 1984).
313. See McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 131 (2d Cir. 1983); cf Morris County Trust for
Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 730 F.2d 94, 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff given further chance to
document fee claim for appeal work).
314. See Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1984) (plaintiff "well advised to mainStain detailed, contemporaneous time records"). But cf Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d
1205, 1207 (1Ith Cir.) (failure to keep contemporaneous time records does not justify automatic
reduction), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of
Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (details sufficient for evaluation required, but contemporary records not indispensable).
315. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (Ist Cir. 1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713
F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1983); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d
1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1983).
316. See Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 193 (7th Cir. 1984); Domingo v. New England
Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1447 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), modified to permitfee award, 742 F.2d 520
(9th Cir. 1984); King v. McCord, 621 F.2d 205, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1980).
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to be more important than determining the hourly rate, the first two
3 17
problems are critical.
As to the first problem, no standard method exists for determining
the actual number of hours involved. Most tasks in litigation are not
standardized. It might be reasonable for a lawyer to spend anywhere
from five to ten hours on a given task. In such a case, it would be appropriate to award a fee for the number of hours actually worked up to ten.
If a lawyer in fact works only five hours but claims ten, neither the judge
nor the opposing counsel will be able to contradict the claim. There is
always the potential that lawyers will overstate the number of hours
worked. In the case of a paying client, the lawyer who wants to retain
client satisfaction will have an incentive to limit the total fee. That incentive is not present in fee award cases.
The second problem, judging the reasonableness of the hours devoted to work, is also difficult. The lawyer should spend the time necessary to do a task well, without waste or duplication; it is not easy,
however, to identify an appropriate amount of time because lawyers'
styles of work differ. What works for one lawyer will not necessarily
work for another. One lawyer will spend more time researching the law;
another will spend more time developing the facts. A massive amount of
time spent on motions may represent a massive amount of time saved at
trial. Even if the judge were able to investigate the lawyer's style in detail, only a rough estimate of the appropriate time would be possible.
Finally, it is inherently difficult to apply market limitations on the
fee. In private litigation there is a market limitation on the amount of
time that can be invested at standard rates. 318 In many fee-shifting cases,
however, the statutes are built on the conclusion that, considering the
externalized benefits involved, the market fee rates are inadequate to induce an appropriate level of litigation. This implies that the private market limitations can furnish no guide at all in setting the fee, since the fee
317. Courts have made some efforts to address these problems. For example, courts have on
occasion pared hours because of duplication of work by several lawyers. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v.
Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 953 (Ist Cir. 1984); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,
711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983). Some courts have approved arbitrary percentage cuts for suspected but unproven duplication of services. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 63637 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
Courts have also pared hours where the number of hours claimed is manifestly high. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 953-54 (1st Cir. 1984); Louisville Black Police Officers Org.,
Inc. v. City of Louisville, 700 F.2d 268, 279 (6th Cir. 1983). One study indicates that the amount of
time invested in a particular case depends on a host of variables, including interaction with adversaries. See Kritzer, supra note 9, at 579-81. Although the size of the stake affects the amount of time a
private practitioner would invest, id. at 581, courts cannot use this factor in civil rights cases.
318. This limitation may have little practical effect. Even sophisticated clients would find it

difficult to challenge effectively any but the grossest hourly billing excesses.
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award is granted in the first place to avoid those limitations, at least

31 9
where there are in fact externalized benefits in the particular case.

Where the market is needed most-to help formulate appropriate limits
on the number of hours than can be claimed-it cannot be used at all. 320
2. The Rate Element in Calculating the Fee Under the Market
Method.

The Supreme Court advanced a market orientation in Blum,

saying that fee awards were to be calculated "according to the prevailing
market rates in the relevant community. 3 2 1 But since the premise of the
fee awards statutes, at least in civil rights cases, is that there is no market

that will attract appropriate legal services, the "market" by which fees
are measured must be not a market for the very services at issue, but an

analogous market. Courts might seek to find the analogous market in
either (1) the rates that lawyers in the community charge for services of

comparable quality 322 or (2) the rates that other lawyers of similar skill,
experience and reputation charge in the community. The fee-claiming

lawyer's own customary charges to fee-paying clients might be relevant
under either heading.
The first approach seeks to identify a market value for services of a

given quality, regardless of the identity of the provider of those services;
the second approach seeks to identify a market value for the particular

lawyer's experience, reputation, and general skill, regardless of the level
of the services actually rendered. Under the second approach, the lawyer
whose experience or reputation is at the level of lawyers who are generally unable to command high fees would be compensated at a relatively
low rate even for superb professional work. At the same time, the experienced lawyer with an established reputation would be compensated at a
relatively high rate, even for poor work. Under the first approach, the
319. In City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986), five Justices favored requiring some
indication of external benefits where the fee award exceeds the damages. See supra text accompanying notes 308-09.
320. See:Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1983) (acknowledging
difficulty of placing a monetary value on relief sought for infringement of civil or constitutional
rights and recognizing that "market-place factors are often absent from civil rights litigation").
321. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).
322. On the other hand, lawyers have not been permitted to import their higher rates to the
forum if local, lower-priced lawyers could and would have done the job. See Avalon Cinema Corp.
v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137, 141 (8th Cir. 1982). But when it is shown or assumed that it was
reasonable to use nonlocal lawyers, courts have permitted lawyers to bill at their higher home rates.
See Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1983); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760,
768-69 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956 (1983). Legal services lawyers who receive a fixed
salary are entitled to fee awards calculated at the same hourly rates used by their counterparts in
private practice, but home location of the salaried lawyer in New York does not authorize importation of New York fee structures to Louisville. See Louisville Black Police Officers Org., Inc. v. City
of Louisville, 700 F.2d 268, 277-78 (6th Cir. 1983).
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positions of the two lawyers would be reversed, with the lawyer doing the
better work receiving the higher rate of compensation. Both approaches
are objective, but they attempt to measure different things.
And each approach has its own impracticalities. The first test
would require the court to evaluate the lawyer's services and compare
them with services "sold" at various rates by other lawyers in the community. As a first step this would require an assessment of the quality of
the lawyer's services. Since quality is partly a function of efficient use of
time, most of which is spent out of court, this estimate itself may be
difficult. The second step would require comparison between the quality
of services rendered by the fee-claimant and some other comparable
services for which a rate can be established. Estimates on this score are
also likely to be inaccurate, and certainly they place an added burden on
the courts.
The second test treats the lawyer, not the services, as the commodity
that is marketed. The attempt under this test would be to compensate
the lawyer based on his experience and reputation in the relevant community, not on a hindsight evaluation of the particular services rendered.
But this test has a serious distorting effect. One reason why less experienced lawyers might be paid lower rates is that they are less efficient in
use of time; they may bill more hours than experienced lawyers who bill
at a higher rate. Application of the second test would create inequities in
the case of a relatively inexperienced lawyer who performs the highest
quality work with highest efficiency. The lawyer's inexperience would
lead to a lower rate of compensation; the efficiency in use of hours would
be reflected not in a higher fee award but in a reduced one.
Blum appeared to adopt the second approach. The fee claimant, the
Court said, had the burden of showing "that the requested rates are in
line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by law323
yers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation."
Under this standard, the market rate for services of the same quality
would apparently be irrelevant. But Blum may be deceptive. In another
part of the opinion, the Court implied that the quality of services rendered should be considered in fixing the hourly rate. The lodestar award
is not to be adjusted upward, the Court said, unless "the quality of service rendered was superior to that one reasonably should expect in light
'324
of the hourly rates charged.
323. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984).
324. Id. at 899. If the hourly rate is too low, the most obvious thing to do would be to raise it to
the market level. Cf Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 739-40 (lst Cir. 1984) ("[U]nder Blum
certain of the qualities sought to be recognized by the bonuses might better have been recognized by
means of more adequate hourly rates."). However, it may be that the Blum Court had in mind
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The apparent conflict in Blum may be no conflict at all. It is far
from clear that the Court definitively identified a single market to be con-

sidered. It is not clear, for example, whether reputation is important in
itself, or whether it is important as proof of the lawyer's ability to market

services, or whether it is important as proof of the quality of his services.
The effect of Blum, in other words, might be to promulgate a list of fac-

tors, not a principle identifying a particular market.
If Blum is interpreted in this way, the Court has invited lower
courts to look to a series of factors rather than to any identifiable or even
theoretical market in assessing fee awards. Like the Johnson factors,
these factors are highly subjective; it will not be easy to take proof or

assign values to "comparable skill" and "reputation." But it would be
paradoxical, to say the least, if the Blum Court, having established objective market valuations as the standard for fee claims, then returned to

such subjective factors as the ultimate measure of compensation.
An alternative might be to use the lawyer's own customary rates,

either on the ground that they reflect the market for similar services of
similarly qualified lawyers in the community or on the ground that they

are the market for that particular lawyer's services. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 3 25 the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit adopted this very solution. Although a historic rate
rule is not an obvious application of the Blum "skill, experience, and
reputation" test, it might nonetheless represent the best method for in3 26
corporating all those factors.
The Laffey rule is problematic in some respects, however. The prac-

tical effect of the Laffey approach will vary quite a bit depending on
permitting a "quality enhancement" when the hourly rate is the historic market for the services of
the particular lawyer. For example, the $50 per hour charged by a recently admitted lawyer may be
the same rate charged by other recently admitted lawyers. But that lawyer may have performed like
a seasoned veteran. One of the ambiguities about the lodestar method is whether it calls for the
lawyer's own historical rate or a rate that lawyers with identical skills could command. The Court
in Blum may be taking a compromise position with regard to this ambiguity by suggesting that in
such a case the lawyer should recover the personal hourly rate of $50, but with an enhancement. If
this is not the point, it is difficult to see why, having selected the hourly rate as the main means of
access to the market evaluation, the Court would not simply call for an adjustment of the hourly rate
to reflect the market value of the services.
325. 746 F.2d 4, 13-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3488 (1985). Cf Levmore, SelfAssessed Valuation Systems for Tort and OtherLaw, 68 VA. L. REv. 771 (1982) (arguing that selfassessment can be useful in solving valuation problems in a variety of legal areas).
326. The Laffey court presented the historic rate test not as an application of the Blum test, but
rather as an acceptable alternative. The court suggested that the Supreme Court adopted the prevailing market rate test in Blum as a matter of convenience since Blum involved legal aid lawyers
who had no established billing rates. But the court did not interpret Blum as precluding the use of
the "customary charges" or "historic rate" test in cases involving lawyers who had established rates.
Laffey, 746 F.2d at 16-18.

Vol. 1986:435]

AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES

whether the lawyer customarily charges more or less than the market
rate charged for similar services or charged by similarly situated lawyers.
The rates set by other firms arguably should limit the award under this
approach. 327 Awarding the lawyer's own customary fees might reinforce
and encourage that lawyer's inefficiencies. 32 8 Despite these problems,
Laffey does offer a somewhat objective basis for fee awards in cases
where the lawyer has a private practice and bills paying clients for similar work.
A historic rate test, however, would have no application in many
fee-shifting cases. Publicly supported lawyers and salaried lawyers do
not make charges to their clients, at least not in the same way that billing
lawyers do. The Supreme Court has held that legal aid lawyers are entitled to the fees they or their services could command in the private market. 329 The strongest argument against this was that public interest
lawyers usually have lower overhead costs than do private practitioners.
The Court rejected this argument, however, and asserted that the "reasonable fee" the statute commanded meant the market rate fee. 330 The
effect was to discard the Laffey solution for publicly supported lawyers.
Their fees, like those of others, must be estimated by one of the other
methods-each of which carries its own special disadvantage.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The present fee-fixing process is not a very good one. Arriving at
an accurate and reasonable fee award requires much time and effort.
Thus after the first litigation comes a second, with added costs and fee
awards of its own. Although full-scale litigation over the fee award is
expensive, without it courts run the risk of unjustified fee awards with
concomitant injustice to defendants. But even allowing full-scale litigation over the fee award is unlikely to solve every problem: it is extremely
unlikely, for example, that a court in any proceeding can ever fairly assess the time claimed.
If we simply try to live with the present fee award system, expensive
and demoralizing as it may be, we are confronted with a host of practical
problems. The time and rate issues, for example, require extensive fac327. Id. at 24-25.
328. Given the low level of client understanding of the process, lawyers who staff cases inefficiently might charge just as much as lawyers who staff efficiently. The court in Laffey took the
position that this was not a problem provided the lawyer staffs the case in the same way he staffs
paying client cases. Laffey, 746 F.2d at 26. The combination of staffing patterns and hourly rates
was still subject to a requirement that the overall bill be reasonable. Id.
329. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).
330. Id.

490
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tual development in every single case. Adopting a standardized hourly
rate schedule would be of little help. Even if it were fair to all lawyers,
which seems pretty optimistic, it would do nothing to control excessive
claims for hours worked.
In this state of affairs, alternative means of financing litigation ought
to be explored. Because we have a highly adversarial system that involves a great deal of creative work, it is very difficult to settle on fixed
fees and standard charges. But those engaged in thinking about public
finance may well come up with some solutions. Public entity defendants
who are liable for fees of the prevailing plaintiff are already paying the
plaintiff's lawyers. Since the government pays the lawyers, we ought to
find a way to pay them more economically. It is at least possible to think
of these lawyers as government lawyers who should be paid a salary like
other government lawyers. This would attract lawyers who are at least
of the same caliber as other government-paid lawyers, and it would save
both the cost of fee shifting and the costs of excessive fees.
Other kinds of cases might lend themselves to completely different
solutions. For example, grants from independent governmental corporations, or a combination of such grants and private foundation grants,
could be used to finance institutional restructuring cases. A grant approach could permit advance budgeting and even the hiring of salaried
legal staff. The costs of fee shifting could thus be entirely avoided.
A grant approach probably would not work well in private or commercial class action suits. But in such cases a fiat percentage fee, based
on a percentage known in advance, might be preferable to the present
system. A different approach could likewise be formulated for cases involving litigation misconduct. Fee awards might be treated as punitive
rather than compensatory, with the result that litigation fault, not compensation principles, would determine the size of the award. In cases
likely to generate only meager damage awards, fee awards might be calculated by multiplying the damage award by some standard figure; using
a single multiplier across the board might be preferable to litigating the
fee issue case by case.
Some of these may turn out on analysis and comparison with other
options to be poor choices. Perhaps there is no way that the present
system can be improved. But it is too soon to say that. The options have
not been identified, much less considered. This survey points out enough
of the problems to indicate that it is time to explore other ways to finance
litigation.

